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ADJUDICATING INSURANCE POLICY 
DISPUTES: A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR 
RANDALL’S PROPOSAL TO ABANDON 
CONTRACT LAW 
Jared Wilkerson* 
Introduction 
here continues to be stark confusion and tense debate about 
the proper role of courts in insurance disputes. Recently, 
commentators have offered numerous proposals on how 
insurance law — a special blend of contract law and public policy 
— should be approached by the courts when interpreting 
insurance policies.1 This article deals with one of those proposals 
— that by Professor Susan Randall — in an attempt to calm 
concerns it raises and to critique its necessity.2 Particularly, this 
article argues that the current system of judicial interpretation of 
                                                          
 * J.D./M.P.P. expected, The College of William & Mary. Special thanks to 
Stephen P. Carney, Esq. for his comments and guidance; and to Stacy for her 
patient encouragement. 
1 Loosely following ERIC M. HOLMES & JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, HOLMES’ 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d § 5.1 (Supp. 2010), I use the term 
“interpretation” to mean the process of determining the meaning of the 
contract. Many courts begin interpretation with a question of law: whether the 
contractual terms themselves are clear and unambiguous to the hypothetical, 
reasonable person. If they are, interpretation ends. If the terms are ambiguous, 
however, interpretation sometimes becomes a question of fact that allows for 
extrinsic evidence — although many courts, as this article will show, resort to 
the strong contra proferentem doctrine before allowing extrinsic evidence. On 
the other hand, some courts (like those in New Mexico) allow extrinsic 
evidence at the first stage, that of determining whether the contractual terms 
are ambiguous. “Construction” is simply the legal effect of contractual terms. 
Thus, construction takes place after terms’ meaning to the parties has been 
established through interpretation.  
2 Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 
107 (2008) [hereinafter Randall, Freedom of Contract]. 
T 
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insurance policies as contracts, with regulatory oversight and 
direction, adequately protects consumers.  
 Randall’s proposal is that courts should begin protecting 
consumers from the dangers of adhesive contracts by refusing to 
evaluate insurance policies as contracts at all — instead 
interpreting them with the goal of effectuating the policy aims of 
legislatures.3 Necessitating her proposal, Randall sees a supposed 
recent judicial repudiation of consumer-protective judicial rules, 
particularly the reasonable expectations doctrine, the strong 
insurance-specific version of the contra proferentem doctrine, and 
the perceived recent judicial refusal to recognize broad tort-based 
bad faith remedies against insurers. These alleged problems are 
set in the context of a perception that legislatures — not private 
parties — already largely control insurance policies because 
neither the insurers (due to pervasive legislation regulating 
insurance policy language and content) nor the insured (because 
policies are presented as standardized contracts of adhesion) have 
the ability to freely contract. Thus, judicial ignorance of 
consumers, in a supposedly sensitive regulated area, leads 
Randall to propose that public policy and not contract law should 
be the lens through which courts adjudicate coverage disputes.  
This proposal has two flaws: first, there is no current or 
recent wave of consumer-repudiating actions by courts in the 
insurance context. In fact, courts have generally adhered to their 
doctrines quite consistently for many years, giving policymakers 
an opportunity to address problems against a consistent 
background of judicial action. Indeed, a review of the states 
whose common law Randall references when claiming that 
consumer-protective doctrines have recently begun falling away 
illustrates that state judicial branches have maintained a 
relatively steady interpretive approach to insurance policy 
disputes. Second, Randall’s proposal is an unpredictable vote of 
zero confidence in state legislatures and insurance departments — 
a direct attack on the legislative power to create and amend 
policy.4 That is, she suggests that some measure of policymaking 
                                                          
3 Randall’s proposal deals little with the sophisticated insured, and this 
article works under the assumption that her proposals would not apply to such 
large and capable parties that can and should either draft or, at least, 
understand policy language. For a discussion of sophisticated insureds and 
particularly their treatment in contra proferentem cases, see JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, VOL. 1, § 4.11 (2d ed. 2006). 
4 Although there are numerous separation of powers arguments to be 
 
Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2011  3:39:00 PM 
296 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 23:3 
power be ceded to courts. Since state legislatures have both the 
authority and the motivation to regulate insurance in the interest 
of consumers, business, and efficiency, problems with consumer 
protection are adequately solved through the lawmaking process.  
The problems Professor Randall points to,5 even assuming 
that consumers are currently under-protected by current 
regulatory schemes, should be addressed by legislatures, which 
have the ability to balance priorities, recognize long-term and 
wide-ranging public policy concerns, and provide benefits to the 
state as a whole rather than to a particular plaintiff alone. Truly, 
if courts were left to guess the mind and goals of the legislature as 
Randall proposes, each case would become an opportunity for 
courts, which are many steps removed from the legislative 
process, to act as proxy for policymakers in a system that would 
prevent insureds or insurers from knowing what their agreement 
means until a court tells them. Insurance policies would become 
nonbinding suggestions of bilateral duties rather than predictable 
instruments whose clear language binds both parties.  
Instead of using ever-shifting and uncertain legislative 
goals as their guiding light, courts should be encouraged to 
interpret legislation and apply the common law in an equitable, 
consistent, and predictable way — something that most state 
courts have been attempting to do for decades — and thereby 
allow legislatures and insurance departments to do their job 
against a stable adjudicatory backdrop. Legislatures, aware of 
the current contract-based adjudicatory scheme, rarely alter it 
and even create laws within it. One must presume that 
legislatures refrain from changing the scheme because they are 
comfortable with its protection of consumers — who also happen 
to be constituent voters. A proposal like Professor Randall’s is 
perilous because it would base judicial decision making on what 
courts believe legislatures want, rather than allowing lawmakers 
to conduct informed balancing of consumer protection, insurer 
                                                          
made against Professor Randall’s proposal, the article addresses them only 
superficially, since the note’s primary purpose is to address the practical and 
public policy aspects of what she suggests. 
5 One obvious problem Randall does not point to is capture of 
policymakers by the industry — an argument she dealt with in her article 
Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 
(1999) [hereinafter Randall, Insurance Regulation]. Such an argument, like 
those she offers in the current proposal, would not necessitate a change in the 
judiciary. Rather, it would call for changes in lobbying laws. 
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solvency, accessibility, and the other worthy goals of insurance 
regulation while answering to the public.  
Professor Robert Keeton’s ill-fated reasonable 
expectations proposal — which called on courts to disregard 
established insurance contract law in favor of validating the 
ephemeral, reasonable expectations of insureds — parallels 
Professor Randall’s current proposal.6 Keeton’s proposal was 
doomed and rejected by nearly all jurisdictions because it did not 
provide for consistent judicial decision making or the 
establishment of predictable precedent. Similarly, Professor 
Randall’s proposal, if adopted, would lead to economic and 
judicial inefficiency that would engender higher rates, higher 
litigation costs, and less insurance coverage for the very 
consumers the proposal is meant to protect.  
To evaluate and critique Randall’s proposal, this article 
briefly introduces the main designers of insurance regulation and 
the public interest aspects of insurance policies in Part I, followed 
in Part II by insurance policies’ traditional contractual aspects. In 
Part III, the article illustrates the special doctrines of insurance 
interpretation and construction that Professor Randall says courts 
have recently abandoned: reasonable expectations, contra 
proferentem, and the action of bad faith against insurers. The 
article then evaluates Professor Randall’s proposal in Part IV. 
Concluding, the article argues that, given legislatures’ extensive 
protection of consumers and lawmakers’ ability to adjust the 
rules that courts apply, judges in each state should continue to 
treat insurance policies consistently to provide their respective 
legislatures with a steady judicial setting against which to 
balance public policy. Courts should not, as Randall advocates, 
treat insurance contracts as consumer-protecting 
instrumentalities to be construed in light of the legislature’s 
unstated intent—intent that may change with every election. By 
relying on consistent principles of statutory application and 
insurance contract law, courts rightly leave the duty of balancing 
consumer protection, insurer solvency, access to insurance, and 
other policy goals to legislatures and insurance departments. This 
is true regardless of whether the courts employ the reasonable 
expectations doctrine, a strong contra proferentem doctrine, or a 
cause of action in tort for breach of insurance policy. 
                                                          
6 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions (Parts I and II), 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970) and 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1970). 
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Predictability will allow insurance companies to continue 
gathering relevant data and to underwrite policies with the most 
reasonable premiums, because predictability allows insurers to 
estimate losses with relative certainty and to justify their 
premiums to the marketplace and to regulators based on these 
empirical, actuarial predictions. Consistency promotes the best 
protection for consumers as created both by market forces and 
consumers’ own elected representatives. 
I. Insurance Law’s Roots in State Policy and Regulation 
The insurance industry is highly regulated because of its 
enormous importance to not only individual policyholders, but 
the public generally.7 Indeed, every insurance policy is both a 
private contract and an implement of public policy. Further, 
those types of insurance which are more important to the public, 
like health insurance and workers’ compensation, are subject to 
heavier regulation. Additionally, like banks and other financial 
institutions, insurance companies hold — and take investment 
risks with — other peoples’ money. There is also ample 
opportunity for insurance companies to contribute to or even 
create social stratification and discrimination.8 Thus, among 
other things, regulation must ensure that these companies are 
solvent while charging reasonable premiums, that they employ 
sound underwriting standards while avoiding undue 
discrimination, and that they provide broad access while not 
spreading capital too thinly.9 Both the social and the individual 
aspects of insurance must be respected by regulation, allowing 
individuals freedom to contract while encouraging society to treat 
its members fairly and to protect citizens and their transactions.10 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §2:1 n.2 
(2010) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2008) (stating “Congress hereby declares that 
the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of 
insurance is in the public interest. . . .”) (emphasis added)) [hereinafter COUCH 
ON INSURANCE]. 
8 See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 637–43 (2d ed. 2008). 
9 For a general discussion of the rationales behind insurance regulation, 
see id. at 1–21. 
10 Some types of insurance, such as auto and homeowners’ insurance, are 
even seen as playing a gatekeeping role for society: if a person cannot protect 
others from his own liability (i.e., if he does not have insurance), he should not 
be able to engage in favored activities (e.g., driving or owning a home). See id. 
at 9–12. 
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Consequently, insurance is a heavily-regulated industry that 
often acts as an arm of the government to reflect legislative goals 
and an arm of civil society to reflect social goals such as 
trustworthiness, accountability, freedom, and solidarity.11  
State legislatures, state insurance departments, and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) are 
the primary official or semi-official players in insurance 
regulation; in addition to courts, Congress, and the industry itself. 
To present the public policy of insurance law, it is necessary to 
introduce these top players.  
A. State Legislatures 
State regulation of the business of insurance has always 
been the norm in the United States.12 In fact, when Congress 
finally addressed the question in 1944, states had already been 
regulating insurance for well over one hundred years. The 
McCarran-Ferguson Act13 was simply Congress’s reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s declaration that insurance was an 
                                                          
11 Id. at 12–21. 
12 Federal statutes regulating the corporate nature of insurance companies, 
such as the tax code, employment laws, and securities laws, always control 
insurance companies because these do not deal with the “business of 
insurance.” See, e.g., SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) 
(stating variable annuities do not fall under the business of insurance and are 
therefore subject to SEC registration requirements); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 
393 U.S. 453 (1969) (holding an Arizona law meant to protect stockholders of 
insurance companies does not fall under the McCarran-Ferguson Act because 
it deals with securities and stockholder-company relations rather than insurer-
insured relations, i.e., the business of insurance; thus, the SEC can regulate the 
stockholder-insurance company relations). Additionally, federal laws that 
overlap with a state’s regulation of insurance but do not directly target 
insurance or “invalidate, impair, or supersede” the state’s regulatory scheme 
are often upheld as long as there is no direct conflict and the impact of the 
federal law does not unduly influence the state scheme. See generally Humana 
Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999) (stating that, with regard to RICO’s 
interference of Nevada’s regulation of insurance under 18 U.S.C. § 1012(b), 
“[w]hen federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when 
application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or 
interfere with a State’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
does not preclude its application.”) (cited with approval in Weiss v. First 
Unum Life Ins. Co., 482 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that a cause of action 
under RICO was possible even though the petitioner was suing an insurance 
company that was otherwise regulated by New Jersey state law). 
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2010). 
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implementation of interstate commerce and, thus, subject to 
congressional regulation.14 Before Southeastern Underwriters, 
states regulated insurance thanks in part to tradition and largely 
because of Paul v. Virginia, a counterintuitive Supreme Court 
ruling in 1868 that insurance was not subject to congressional 
regulation because “issuing a policy of insurance is not a 
transaction of commerce.”15 At the time of Paul, after decades of 
regulation at the state level, many insurers hoped for federal 
regulation because so much of their business crossed state lines, 
making them lose time and money by dealing with differing 
regulatory schemes.16 The Court halted their hopes.17  
Ironically, the Court also differed from the wishes of many 
insurers and state regulators in 1944 when it reversed itself in 
Southeastern Underwriters, which frightened both the industry 
and state regulators by making insurance (including, most 
importantly, rate-fixing) subject to such broad-reaching federal 
laws as the Sherman and Clayton Acts and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act — in addition to potentially stripping the states 
of some insurance company tax revenue.18 Thus, three-quarters of 
a century after Paul, industry leaders and regulators were not 
only happy with the state scheme, they wanted to see it succeed. 
Thus, they lobbied for the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in which 
Congress stated: 
The business of insurance, and every person engaged 
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States 
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such 
business. . . .No Act of Congress shall be construed to 
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any 
State for the purpose of regulating the business of 
                                                          
14 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 22 U.S. 533 (1944). 
15 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868). 
16 See, e.g., Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A 
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 
472–73 (1961) (discussing the beginning of state insurance regulation in the 
1820s and its normalization throughout the 1850s and 1860s). 
17 Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 630–31. 
18 See Spencer L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, The Adequacy of State 
Insurance Rate Regulation: The McCarran-Ferguson Act in Historical 
Perspective, 56 MICH. L. REV. 545, 553–56 (1958) (describing the desire of the 
insurance industry for federal regulation until Southeastern Underwriters 
scared them — and state regulators — into lobbying for the McCarran-
Ferguson Act). 
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insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such 
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance.19  
McCarran-Ferguson pleased both insurers and state 
regulators, but Congress maintained its ability to step into 
insurance regulation if states did not perform well enough. To 
protect themselves, insurers and state regulators banded together 
more closely than they had in the past — strengthening the 
NAIC, which was already decades old — and created model 
regulations that would allow insurers to avoid seemingly onerous 
federal laws and permit state regulators to improve the quality 
and scope of their own regulations while maintaining control and 
taxation of insurance.20  
Thus, Congress has left insurance regulation to state 
legislatures, unless it passes a federal law that specifically 
regulates insurance for the entire nation.21 Indeed, every state has 
an insurance code, a detailed body of legislation that governs how 
the business of insurance is to be conducted within the state. 
However, even with broad authority in this area, state laws must 
conform to greater federal and state constitutional concerns that 
apply to all legislation, such as due process, equal protection, 
contract impairment, and uncompensated takings, in addition to 
avoiding federal preemption in those areas that Congress has 
acted to explicitly regulate insurance.22 
                                                          
19 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2010). 
20 Kimball & Boyce, supra note 18, at 555. 
21 Companies can also step outside the protection of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act if they engage in boycotts, coercion, or intimidation. See 
generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (interpreting 
15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (2010), which states that “[n]othing contained in this 
chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to 
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.”).  
22 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 2:2. Since this articles deals 
with insurance contracts — and possible interference of them through more 
adjudicatory power — it must be noted that the Contract Clause, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10, cl. 1, has been interpreted liberally in the insurance context. 
Review of regulations affecting contracts is subject to something akin to 
rational basis review. If the legislation has a significant and legitimate public 
purpose and the contract impairment is attributable to reasonable conditions 
related to the public purpose, it will be upheld. See generally Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). However, a 
small number of such challenges have been upheld: see, e.g., Smith v. Dep’t. of 
Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (a section of the state’s Tort Reform and 
Insurance Act was found to violate the Contract Clause because it required all 
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State regulation has been the norm even since the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (viz. the Financial Services Modernization 
Act)23 of 1999 allowed the consolidation of two federally-
regulated industries (banking and securities) with the state-
regulated insurance industry, providing for the creation of the 
“financial services industry” that brought us the sub-prime 
mortgage/investment-backed securities crisis of 2007.24 In light of 
the crisis and perceived inefficiencies, many commentators have 
written proposals to attack state regulation, the most salient 
suggestion being for a single-licensing, federal charter option that 
would allow insurance companies to seek a federal charter 
permitting them access to all fifty states, while maintaining 
states’ ability to compete over the details not addressed by the 
minimum federal standards.25 Others, even members of Congress, 
have proposed more wholesale federal regulation even though, 
judging by the arguably negative effects of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, federal regulation might not be a good solution.26 The 
closest federal law has come to broadly regulating insurance is 
                                                          
commercial liability policies in effect between certain dates to provide credits 
or rebates because of probable benefits stemming from tort reform); Health 
Ins. Ass’n of America v. Harnett, 376 N.E.2d 1280 (N.Y. 1978) (mandatory 
maternity care could not be required in guaranteed renewal policies). 
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2006). 
24 For a discussion of the problems with the Financial Services 
Modernization Act and its probable connection to the recent financial crisis, 
see Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together 
Let No Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to 
the 2008–2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALBANY L. REV. 371 
(2010); Paul Krugman, The Gramm Connection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, 
available at http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/the-gramm- 
connection/. 
25 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Single-License 
Solution, REGULATION, Winter 2008-2009, at 36 available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/ regulation/regv31n4/v31n4-6.pdf; Leo Donatucci, 
Current Issues in Public Policy: Federal Regulation of the Insurance Industry: 
One for All and All for Who? How Federal Regulation Would Help the 
Industry Into the New Millennia, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 398 (2010). 
26 See, e.g., National Insurance Protection Act, H.R. 1880 (introduced by 
Reps. Bean (D–IL) and Royce (D–CA) 111th Cong (2009) (proposes the creation 
of an Office of National Insurance within the Department of the Treasury, 
with power to license, regulate and supervise national insurers); see also 
Donatucci, supra note 25, at 398; see generally BAIRD WEBEL & CAROLYN 
COBB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31982, INSURANCE REGULATION: 
HISTORY, BACKGROUND, AND RECENT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (2005), 
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ RL31982_20050211.pdf.  
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the creation, within the Department of the Treasury, of the 
Federal Insurance Office, which was part of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.27 This law, 
passed in July 2010, is a response to the recent recession. Because 
insurance is often found under the same roof as banking and 
securities services, and given that players such as AIG 
contributed to the economic downturn, insurance was a natural 
target of the Dodd-Frank bill. However, the bill appears to be 
fairly innocuous as to insurance regulation. In relevant part, the 
Office is only granted power to monitor and collect data from the 
insurance industry, to analyze those data, to consult with states 
on matters of federal and international concern, to make annual 
reports to Congress and the President, to preempt state laws that 
treat certain non-United States insurers less favorably than 
United States insurers, and to give advice to the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the newly-created Financial Stability Oversight 
Council on risky insurers. In fact, subsection (k) of § 502 (the 
section establishing and defining the office) states that the Office 
is not given “general supervisory or regulatory authority over the 
business of insurance.” For now, then, insurance regulation at the 
legislative level is squarely in the hands of states, aside from those 
few instances in which Congress has specifically affected 
insurance.28  
Legislatures regulate insurance both by passing laws and 
by empowering state agencies — i.e., insurance departments — to 
administer many of those laws. Some laws are even written for 
the courts to apply. For example, many states have rules that 
restrict courts’ ability to construe insurance applications or 
policies against the insured.29 With such legislative ability to 
                                                          
27 Pub. L. 111-203 §§ 501–543, 111th Cong. (2010). 
28 See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1001–1461 (West 2010) (preempting state insurance law that 
operates on self-funded employer health plans). 
29 See generally, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-300–325 (West 2010). A salient 
example is § 38.2-309 (requiring courts to construe statements on an insurance 
application as representations rather than warranties and requiring courts to 
find coverage even in the face of applicant misrepresentations, unless the 
insurer can prove that it relied on the material misstatement when granting 
coverage). See also CAL. INS. CODE § 382.5(e) (West 2010) (stating that binders 
must be construed as insurance policies); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3106 (McKinney 
2010) (defining “warranty” and preventing a court from finding avoidance of 
an insurance contract for breach of warranty unless the breach materially 
increase the risk of loss under the contract); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.054 
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protect consumers even through the courts, one may legitimately 
question whether Randall’s proposal (and others like it30) are 
solutions in search of a problem. That is, with the legislature 
protecting insureds both directly and through insurance 
departments, what reason do commentators have to seek new 
judicial doctrines that presumably attempt the same thing in a 
less uniform and predictable way? 
B. Insurance Departments 
Insurance departments (or bureaus) are the states’ 
administrative agencies that, under power given them by the 
legislature, regulate insurance.31 The power of each states’ 
respective department is usually vested in the hands of an 
insurance commissioner or superintendent, under whose 
authority the department can normally (1) create and implement 
rules regulating insurance (including rates, market conduct, 
accessibility, pre-approval of insurance policy language,32 
construction of policy language, etc.); (2) issue cease and desist 
orders or bring enforcement actions in court against those 
breaking rules or statutes related to insurance; and (3) enlist the 
aid of the Attorney General and state prosecutors when engaged 
in civil or criminal enforcement.33 Although these departments 
are administrative agencies, decision makers and administrative 
judges within the departments (or, more likely, within a 
                                                          
(Vernon 2005) (requiring that the entire subsection be liberally construed to 
require prompt payment of claims). 
30 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance 
Law: Why Insurance Contracts Should not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 
30 GA. L. REV. 171 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social 
Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
203 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL 
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009). 
31 In some states, such as New York, the insurance department is an 
independent state agency; in others, such as Virginia, it is a subsection of a 
larger department, such as a state corporation commission. 
32 From one perspective, the fact that the language of the policy has been 
approved by the state insurance department suggests that the insured has 
already been protected — although this view is subject to the criticism that 
insurance departments are overworked and understaffed, and simply cannot 
foresee all possible conflicts under policy language. 
33 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12.1-16 (2010); CODE OF VA. § 12.1-16 (2010); 
REV. CODE OF WASH. § 48.02 (2010).  
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generalist department of administrative adjudication)34 do not 
normally35 adjudicate insurance policy disputes between 
                                                          
34 See generally Michael Asimow, The Fourth Reform: Introduction to the 
Administrative Law Review Symposium on State Administrative Law, 53 
ADMIN L. REV. 395, 398–99 (2001) (discussing the origins and rise of the 
central administrative judicial panel, noting that a majority of states and many 
large cities used central panels). 
35 Three notable and often consumer-protecting bends in this rule are: (1) 
the adjudication of unfair trade practices; (2) the adjudication of rights (even 
perhaps contract rights) that are “incidental to” an agency’s proper 
adjudicatory authority; and (3) the preliminary adjudication of private 
disputes that are comprehensively regulated.  
 First, most states have enacted a version of the Model Unfair Trade 
Practices act (promulgated by the NAIC as a model act), which is meant to 
protect consumers from statutorily-defined unfair actions (including improper 
discrimination) of insurance companies in raising rates or in denying, 
narrowing, or halting coverage. See BAKER, supra note 8, at 710–11. These 
acts often provide for private causes of action (see infra, Part IV(A)(3)), in 
addition to the ability of the insurance commissioner to bring an action before 
the agency, which allow a harmed insured to seek damages from the insurer in 
court. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 4:20 (giving examples 
from various jurisdictions). However, when a statute or the common law (by 
implying a cause of action from the statute; see, e.g., Stonewall Jackson Mem’l 
Hosp. Co. v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 525 S.E.2d 649, 656 (W. Va. 1999)) does 
not provide for a private cause of action, the investigation and decision of the 
issue is usually left solely to the state insurance commissioner, who conducts a 
hearing and rules for or against the insurer, meeting out cease and desist orders 
or penalties. See COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 4:20. In such cases, 
the dispute is not between the insured and the insurer but between the 
commissioner and the insurer. However, since insurers often bring such suits 
about by the filing of complaints, and since they often testify at the hearing, 
this can be considered a bend—however slight—in the general rule that 
administrative adjudications do not involve private contract rights. 
 Second, it is well established in many jurisdictions that where an 
administrative adjudication involves private rights that are incidental to and 
naturally decided together with the agency’s determination of public rights, 
the agency can decide those private rights. See, e.g., McHugh v. Santa Monica 
Rent Control Bd., 777 P.2d 91, 104 (Cal. 1989) (citing cases from various 
states).  
 Third, the state legislature can create a scheme by which seemingly 
private rights are adjudicated under a comprehensive regulatory framework. 
For example, workers’ compensation statutes often provide for administrative 
adjudication of coverage disputes. See, e.g., Dee Enters. v. Indus. Claim 
Appeals Office of State of Colo., 89 P.3d 430, 432 (Colo. App. 2003) (citing 
cases from numerous jurisdictions) (upholding administrative agency’s 
determination, against the employer’s and the insurance company’s factual 
and separation of powers objections, that coverage was due the injured 
worker). Additionally, some states have begun permitting administrative 
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individuals and their insurers. As one insurance commissioner 
put it, “I do not adjudicate controversies between consumers and 
insurers, nor can I direct an insurer to pay a particular claim or 
amount on a claim. That’s for the courts.”36 Although they do not 
have the subject-matter expertise of the agencies, courts do have 
the weight of tradition, common-law stability, and constitutional 
authority behind them.  
Everything the agency does is circumscribed in its 
enabling statute — all of its actions must be explicitly or 
implicitly allowed by that statute as written by the state 
legislature; thus, insurance departments are meant to administer 
the will of the state legislature.37 Each department’s enabling 
statute is slightly different, but there are general themes across 
states. In their quasi-judicial role, the departments often deal 
with licensing, workers’ compensation appeals, state workers’ 
group insurance appeals, appeals from disciplined insurance 
                                                          
agencies to preliminarily adjudicate complaints from insureds regarding the 
improper denial or delay of payments from their insurer. For example, in 
Maryland, the Courts Article not only provides for an action in bad faith, it 
also provides for preliminary administrative determination of the insured’s 
claim. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1701 (West 2010). This is the 
closest administrative agencies come to adjudicating private contractual 
disputes between insurers and insureds. However, even in such workers’ 
compensation and bad faith cases, ultimate judicial review of the 
administrative decision is necessary to enforce payment and thus the decisions 
lack finality. Id.; Dee Enters., 89 P.3d at 434. 
 All three of these quasi-exceptions to the general rule support the main 
argument: legislatures, which have accepted the duty to create policy that best 
balances consumer protection with the other goals of insurance regulation, are 
protecting consumers both through statute and through insurance 
departments; the courts have no need to adopt new standards of interpretation 
and construction.  
36 Alfred W. Gross, Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, Address at the 
William & Mary School of Law (Nov. 30, 2010). It should be noted that an 
“administrative law of contracts” has been proposed, particularly in the area of 
adhesive contracts, which proposal would allow contracts to be adjudicated 
through administrative agencies. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts 
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 533 
(1971). This proposal has gained little traction, and even adhesive contracts 
have largely been left to judicial — rather than administrative — 
interpretation.  
37 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 2:8 (stating “[a]lthough the 
insurance commission has a wide range of discretion in discharging the duties 
and responsibilities imposed upon it, it has no inherent powers and may only 
exercise those that have been expressly granted to it by constitution or statute, 
or those that are necessarily or reasonably implied therefrom”).  
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agents, reimbursement of public hospital medical care costs, etc.38 
In their quasi-legislative role, many departments develop and 
issue binding rules regulating rates, market conduct, 
discrimination, underwriting procedures, cash reserves and 
equity requirements, etc.39 In their quasi-executive role, the 
departments police the market by performing solvency and 
consumer treatment inspections, initiating investigations into 
violations of rules and laws, and issuing fines, injunctions, or 
taking a company through receivership and dissolution. Criminal 
prosecutions have to be carried out by the state Attorney 
General’s office, often at the department’s behest.40 Additionally, 
insurance commissioners may advocate public policy alternatives 
by working with the legislature to clarify the effect of proposals 
on citizens and businesses.41  
In none of these activities do insurance departments 
involve themselves with resolving contractual disputes between 
an insurer and an insured. They do, of course, issue rules 
regulating the relationship between insurers and insureds and 
they also can investigate and enforce rules against insurers who 
do not treat insureds fairly, but insurance departments do not, in 
most cases, have authority to adjudicate private contracts — that 
is, disputes that do not involve a government actor.42 Thus, 
although insurance departments are often granted broad powers 
to act as an administrative agency, and can therefore help 
determine the decisional rules of courts,43 they are not given the 
ability to act as common law courts themselves. Although 
Randall’s proposal does advocate a consumer-interest approach 
to insurance contract adjudications, she does not go so far as to 
suggest that these disputes should be carried out by state 
administrative judges. 
Insurance commissioners and, by extension, their 
                                                          
38 HOLMES & APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at §§ 170.1–5. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Gross, supra note 36. 
42 See, e.g., Texas’s State Office of Administrative Hearings website, 
http://www.soah.state.tx.us/about-us/SOAH-teams.asp, which details the cases 
they adjudicate. Although some are appeals from the state’s Department of 
Insurance, none of them are contract disputes between private parties. 
43 See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 613 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1993) (the 
Superintendent of Insurance issued regulations that acted as persuasive 
authority to overturn judicial precedent, causing a later case to be decided 
differently). 
Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2011  3:39:00 PM 
308 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 23:3 
departments, do not work in home-state-centric vacuums. 
Although their individual authority (including the authority to 
affect how courts interpret policy language) is binding only in 
their state, each commissioner is a member of the NAIC, which 
has de facto authority to, if nothing else, nudge and incentivize 
individual commissioners to be part of the crowd. 
C. NAIC 
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
was formed in 1871, shortly after the Paul decision.44 As an 
association with no de jure public power, its original mission was 
to foster economic efficiency by seeking uniformity in insurance 
regulation — a role that it has continued to play but that has 
become more important as federal pressure for greater uniformity 
has continued to grow.45 Officially,  
[t]he mission of the NAIC is to assist state insurance 
regulators, individually and collectively, in serving the 
public interest and achieving the following fundamental 
insurance regulatory goals in a responsive, efficient and 
cost effective manner, consistent with the wishes of its 
members: 
Protect the public interest; 
Promote competitive markets; 
Facilitate the fair and equitable treatment of insurance 
consumers; 
Promote the reliability, solvency and financial solidity 
of insurance institutions; and 
Support and improve state regulation of insurance.46 
                                                          
44 Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 630. 
45 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372, 
INSURANCE RECIPROCITY AND UNIFORMITY: NAIC AND STATE 
REGULATORS HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN PRODUCER LICENSING, PRODUCT 
APPROVAL, AND MARKET CONDUCT REGULATION, BUT CHALLENGES 
REMAIN 6–8 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09372.pdf 
[hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372]. 
46 About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/ 
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In furtherance of these somewhat vague goals, the NAIC 
engages in various activities meant to encourage — or, as some 
argue,47 impose — a baseline of strong, consistent regulation in 
every state. Randall described these activities in her oft-cited 
article on NAIC’s involvement in insurance regulation:  
The NAIC performs centralized duties that mirror those 
of federal regulators in other industries, including the 
prescription of standard forms for insurance company 
annual financial statements; the coordination of regional 
financial examinations of insurance companies; the 
creation and maintenance of an extensive system of 
national databases to facilitate state monitoring of 
insurers and insurance agents; the rating of non-U.S. 
insurers for the states; the periodic review and 
accreditation of state insurance departments; the 
drafting of model laws and regulations, many of which 
have been adopted by state legislatures; the valuation of 
insurance company investments; training of state 
insurance regulators; the preparation of statistical 
reports for state regulators; the assistance to state 
regulators with technical financial analysis; and the 
assistance to U.S. officials negotiating international 
trade agreements that concern insurance issues. The 
NAIC makes most of its money by selling data to 
states.48  
Currently, the insurance commissioners from all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia (plus the four U.S. territories) 
are members of the NAIC, and the Association strives to walk the 
thin line between establishing important national standards and 
allowing the states to adapt these standards to their particular 
needs. However, avoiding strong de facto impositions on states 
has been difficult since NAIC started its accreditation system. In 
                                                          
index_about.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
47 See, e.g., Kimberley A. Strassel, Carbon Caps through the Backdoor: 
Environmentalists Pressure the Insurance Industry, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 4, 
2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748703862704 
575100004067589846.html (arguing that environmental groups had made 
NAIC force all commissioners to complete a survey that would coerce states 
into capping emissions); see also Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, 
at 636, n. 67. 
48 Randall, supra note 5, at 636–38. 
Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2011  3:39:00 PM 
310 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 23:3 
the late 1980s, after some large insurers went bankrupt, 
commentators called for federal regulation of company solvency 
so as to provide national minimum standards to avoid regulatory 
races to the bottom and, ultimately, more insolvency.49 In 
response, the NAIC created its solvency-focused accreditation 
system, called the Financial Regulation Standards Accreditation 
Program. All states and the District have met minimum 
requirements and are accredited under this program.50 Similarly, 
in response to a more recent outcry for national regulation of 
insurance company market conduct, the NAIC is close to 
implementing its Market Conduct Accreditation Program.51 The 
dialogue between federal (often congressional) actors and the 
NAIC shows how the NAIC (and, by extension, the states) must 
respond to federal pressure or face preemption. Indeed, the 
NAIC’s bowing to cries for federal reformation is likely part of 
the reason that Congress has done relatively little — beyond 
threats that bring the commissioners to agree to standardized 
regulation — to regulate insurance.  
NAIC’s existence and involvement in state regulation of 
insurance demonstrates another layer of protection for 
consumers. Not only does the NAIC propose homegrown actions, 
but it also acts as a forum for insurance commissioners from 
various states to compare and contrast their consumer protections 
with those of other jurisdictions.52 This process of 
experimentation and communication can lead to consumer 
protections that are efficient (in both the equitable and economic 
sense) and applicable to each state. Further, the NAIC has 
already shown a desire to respond with solutions whenever the 
federal government looks at state regulation with a critical eye. 
This also leads to more and, one would hope, improved 
                                                          
49 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-948, INSURANCE 
REGULATION: THE NAIC ACCREDITATION PROGRAM CAN BE IMPROVED 3 
(2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01948.pdf. 
50 See Financial Standards Regulation Program Accredited States, NAT’L 
ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/committees_f_accredited_ 
states.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). For some time, New York, which the 
NAIC itself recognized as having an exemplary system of regulating the 
solvency of insurance companies, was not accredited by the NAIC because its 
system, while exemplary, was different than the NAIC requirements. Randall, 
supra note 5, at 652–53. 
51 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-372, 
supra note 45, at 28–36. 
52 Randall, Insurance Regulation, supra note 5, at 634–39. 
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protections for consumers.53 
In sum, state legislatures, insurance departments, and the 
NAIC are deeply interrelated and all three work — sometimes in 
concert — to protect consumers by promoting faithful insurer 
behavior, insurer solvency, broad access to insurance, and even 
mandated policy language and interpretive mandates. State 
legislatures have near plenary power over insurance regulation, 
but they delegate much of the administration of that regulation to 
their insurance departments, which are headed by insurance 
commissioners who are members of the NAIC. Under the 
NAIC’s equalizing influence and model laws, in addition to 
states’ desire to be different and attractive to business, insurance 
is regulated by a system that is nearly uniform in purpose and 
scope while still being flexible in detail. Particularly, most states 
declare that their goals are to ensure fair premiums, guarantee 
insurance company solvency, prevent unfair market conduct, and 
make insurance coverage widely available.54 Under this system, 
regulation is both predictable and adjustable. Inserting the 
various common law courts’ narrow policy judgments into the 
regulatory realm, as Randall proposes, would push the entire 
system toward uncertainty, and uncertainty would lead to 
inefficiency and injustice for insurers and insureds alike. 
 
II. The Contract Roots of Insurance Law 
The roots of insurance in contract law are deceptively 
simple. They are rested here using broad generalities to remind 
the reader that, as a natural home, there is no better place for 
insurance policy interpretation and construction than contract 
law.  
Contracts come by way of offer, acceptance, and 
consideration. In the insurance context, the offer is generally 
made not by the insurer but by the potential insured, when she 
fills out and submits an application for insurance.55 A blank 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 629 (citing ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE 
LAW § 22 (2d ed. 1996)); Kimball, supra note 16, at 477-78; see also BAKER, 
supra note 8, at 637–56 (describing the goals of insurance regulation, the role of 
the NAIC in coordinating state regulatory efforts, and the boundaries of state 
authority over insurance). 
55 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 11:1 (citing various cases from 
numerous states and giving exceptions to these general rules). 
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application given to a potential insured is not an offer but a mere 
proposal to enter into a contractual relationship. Acceptance is 
generally by the insurer, when it grants coverage based on the 
completed application.56 Consideration is based, for the insured, 
in the premiums paid for the insurance, and for the insurer, in 
indemnification when a covered loss occurs.57  
Nearly all insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, 
meaning that the applicant (offeror) must either adhere to the 
terms of the policy written by the company (offeree) or not be 
granted insurance.58 There is some leeway in this statement, such 
as the ability, in some circumstances, for consumers to mix and 
match types and amounts of coverage while still being denied the 
ability to change the mix available for matching or the terms 
under which each option operates; additionally, some insureds 
are so sophisticated that they are allowed the privilege of either 
approving or drafting the policy language.59 However, for the 
most part, insurance contracts are adhesive contracts; indeed, 
some commentators have gone so far as to label them “super-
adhesive” contracts because, even though they are not prohibited 
from doing so, many insureds do not even see the policy language 
before applying for coverage and because all insurance 
companies offer roughly identical coverage.60 Adhesive contracts 
are usually associated with an imbalance of information; in the 
insurance case, this simply means that the insurance companies, 
which drafted the contract or chose a standardized form to apply, 
have much more information regarding the meaning of the 
                                                          
56 Id. at § 11:3. 
57 See, e.g., American Int’l Life Ins. Co. v. Hartsfield, 248 S.E.2d 518, 520 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (generally, nonpayment of premiums when due results in a 
forfeiture of the policy); Hargis v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 388 
N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (failure to timely pay premiums can 
subject the insured to waiver and/or estoppel); Hampton v. Metro. Ins. Co., 
528 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (insurance policies are contracts; if the 
premiums are not paid, the policy lapses for want of performance); St. Paul 
Mercury Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 301 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Neb. 1981) (the regular 
payment of premiums is the essence of an insurance contract; without it, the 
policy lapses); see also American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. BIM, Inc. 885 
F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1989) (there is no insurance where there is no payment).  
58 See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND 
REGULATION 531–36 (4th ed. 2005). 
59 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the Sophisticated Policyholder 
Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 831–33 
(1993). 
60 Id.; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 58, at 534. 
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contract and its contents than the consumer.61  
The fact that a substantial amount of coverage is required 
by law adds an element of force to the adhesive nature of 
insurance. For example, automobile liability insurance, 
homeowner’s insurance, and worker’s compensation insurance 
are required in certain circumstances.62  
In addition to being contracts of adhesion, insurance 
policies are standardized contracts, meaning that the language is 
boilerplate and similar or identical from one insurer (and state)63 
to another — indeed, many insurance contracts are chosen by 
insurers from a list of available options drafted by the Insurance 
Services Office (“ISO”).64 Standardization allows insurance 
companies and the NAIC to gather data based on comparable 
language in order to make precise underwriting predictions both 
within and across states.65 A side effect of standardization is that 
it perpetuates confusing language — not because the insurance 
companies think that the language is clear to consumers, but 
because the language is predictable in court.66 
                                                          
61 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 125. 
62 JERRY, supra note 54, at 996–98; See generally WEST 50 STATE 
SURVEYS, INSURANCE—UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
(West 2006); ALAN WIDISS, 3 UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
INSURANCE 22 (Anderson Publishing, 2d ed. 1985).  
63 State courts, when interpreting a particular term for the first time, may 
look to interpretations of the term from other states. See Fisher v. Tyler, 394 
A.2d 1199, 1202-03 (Md. 1978) (“[T]he application of this policy provision in a 
factual posture similar to that presented here, has been before the courts of our 
sister states. The decisions of these jurisdictions have special significance in 
this context because heretofore this Court has recognized that ‘like a state 
which adopts, by copying, a foreign statute, . . . parties who adopt an insurance 
policy, which apparently has had nationwide use and has been judicially 
construed in five or six states, adopt with it the uniform judicial construction 
that it has received in other states.’ In other words, while the contract term on 
its face may be ambiguous, which under other circumstances would ordinarily 
generate a jury question, . . . the court in this situation may treat the term as 
unambiguous and, absent any factual dispute, adopt, as a matter of law, that 
construction placed on the language by the courts of other states.”) (citations 
omitted). In other words, courts in one state help courts in other states to issue 
consistent and predictable rulings — contributing favorably to the reliability 
that federal regulators have been seeking lately. 
64 See, e.g., STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 
4.05[A]. 
65 Id.; Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 124.  
66 Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (2006); Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. 
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Sophisticated insureds are often an exception to standard 
insurance policy interpretation. The basic reason for treating 
sophisticated insureds differently than others is that they, or their 
agents and attorneys, write, bargain for, or at least understand 
the policy language that binds them; therefore, they should not 
reap benefits from strong rules meant to protect more vulnerable 
insureds who effectively do not know what they are getting into.67 
Sophisticated insureds pose problems for interpreting courts, 
which have granted protection of the strong contra proferentem 
rule to some sophisticated insureds while withholding it from 
others; indeed, much depends on the degree to which a 
sophisticated insured negotiated for particular terms.68 Courts 
and commentators also debate who should be considered a 
sophisticated insured: should the definition include sophisticated 
parties just because their attorneys can understand the policy’s 
implications, or should the definition only include those parties 
that actually draft or, less stringently, negotiate for policy terms?69 
Such questions form part of the rationale for proposals to reform 
judicial interpretation and construction of insurance policies 
because they are examples and sources of the uncertainty 
surrounding these judicial actions. 
Given that insurance policies are contracts — special and 
problematic contracts, but contracts nonetheless — it makes 
sense that common law courts interpret them according to 
contract law. The judiciary, however, has also recognized that 
insurance contracts are instruments of public policy just as they 
are examples of private ordering; thus, many have taken pains to 
place one foot into the realm of individual consumer (plaintiff) 
                                                          
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. 482 F.3d 976, 977 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[insurance 
companies] are reluctant to alter policy language once its meaning has been 
settled by judicial decision”) (citing sources). 
67 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 59, at 849–56 (arguing for differential 
treatment of sophisticated insureds when various factors are weighed against 
them); c.f., Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the Sophisticated Insured Exception, 
39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003). 
68 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Group, Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 
F.3d 270, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that, under New York law, where a 
sophisticated insured has not negotiated for terms, the insured should benefit 
from the contra proferentem doctrine — which in New York allows for 
extrinsic evidence before application). 
69 See generally, COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 22:24 (citing 
numerous cases for the differing approaches to the treatment of sophisticated 
insureds). 
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protection while keeping the other firmly grounded on the 
traditional principles of contract interpretation and construction. 
The problems of mass-standardization and adhesion sometimes 
lead courts to give up traditional contract principles in favor of 
consumer-oriented rules such as those discussed in the next 
section. 
III. Consumer Protection by Courts 
Courts treat insurance policy interpretation in various 
ways because of the issues of standardization and adhesion, as 
well as insurance’s role in protecting public policy. Generally, 
courts treat insurance policies as contracts with special rules of 
interpretation and construction. Some of these rules (and those 
that Randall focuses on as the basis for her proposal) are (1) an 
especially potent form of the contra proferentem doctrine; (2) the 
pure reasonable expectations doctrine; and (3) liberal availability 
of bad faith remedies against insurers that act improperly.70 
Although they have never been uniform, some worry that courts 
generally have begun to abandon these special consumer-
protective rules, leading to proposals like Professor Randall’s. 
This section introduces some of the more salient controversies in 
the protection of insureds, giving a baseline for the proposal’s 
evaluation in the next section. 
A. The Insurance-Tailored (Strong) Contra proferentem Doctrine 
Contra proferentem, translated literally to “against the 
offeror,”71 is a doctrine that courts use to favor an insured’s 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous policy term over an 
                                                          
70 This article omits another major consumer-protective doctrine, namely 
that of unconscionability, because Randall does not address it. However, it is 
important to remember that, in many jurisdictions, where adhesive policy 
terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter (insurer), those terms can be 
modified or struck down. Both courts and legislatures have provided for the 
unconscionability doctrine to protect consumers. See, e.g., Donald Zupanec, 
Annotation, Doctrine of Unconscionability as Applied to Insurance Contracts 
86 A.L.R.3d 862 (1978) (citing numerous cases); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. 
§ 17.50 (West 2009) (allowing for actions flowing from unconscionable 
insurance contracts). Indeed, some courts see insurance policies as being 
subject to UCC Title 2’s prohibition against unconscionable contracts. See, 
e.g., Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088, 1093-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
71 U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gen. Reinsurance Corp., 949 F.2d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
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insurer’s. In its general form, as used in normal contract 
interpretation, the doctrine is a rule of last resort that is employed 
only when a court cannot — by the contract’s plain language or 
even by extrinsic evidence — determine the parties’ intent.72 
However, in the insurance context, the rule has taken on a 
meaning more favorable to insureds. For example, one 
conception of the rule as applied to ambiguous exclusions is that:  
[I]f a policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
interpretation . . . “Texas law requires an insurance 
policy to be construed against the insurer and in favor 
of the insured”—in other words, in favor of 
coverage. Where an exclusionary provision is 
ambiguous—that is, amenable to two or more 
reasonable interpretations—the court must adopt the 
construction urged by the insured so long as that 
construction is not unreasonable, even if the insurer’s 
construction “appears to be more reasonable or a more 
accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”73  
Thus, as it is still often construed, even in some of the 
states that Randall claims have turned against the doctrine, the 
contra proferentem doctrine is stronger when applied to insurance 
contracts than when applied to contracts in other areas. It often 
applies before reference is made to extrinsic evidence, and 
therefore favors insureds upon the discovery of any ambiguity. 
Professor Randall argues that Texas’s approach is among a dying 
breed: “In recent years, commentators have advocated for 
adherence to usual contract rules,74 and courts have increasingly 
                                                          
72 See generally, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
2010). 
73 Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 600 F.3d 
562, 569 (5th Cir. 2010); however, compare Evergreen Nat. Indem. Co. v. Tan 
It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669, 676 (Tex. App. 2003) (stating that extrinsic 
evidence can be used before resorting to the contra proferentem doctrine, but 
still holding to the proposition that, once the contra proferentem rule is applied 
in an insurance policy dispute, the reasonable construction of the insured 
trumps even the more objectively reasonable construction of the insurer).  
74 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 121 (citing ALLAN 
WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES, § 603 (3d ed. 1995); Scott G. 
Johnson, Resolving Ambiguities in Insurance Policy Language: The Contra 
Proferentem Doctrine and Use of Extrinsic Evidence, 33 THE BRIEF 33, 37 
(2004) (“If ambiguity is present, most courts today will not immediately 
construe the ambiguity against the drafter but instead will attempt to remove 
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applied those rules.”75 Yet even in states that use the general form 
of the doctrine, extrinsic evidence is rarely important, due to the 
lack of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ bargain when adhesive 
contracts are involved.76 
To the extent that courts are paring back the insurance-
tailored contra proferentem doctrine, they are presumably doing 
so for at least the following reasons: first, rashly applying contra 
proferentem before allowing extrinsic evidence can prevent the 
court from upholding the parties’ intent;77 second, the strict 
contra proferentem rule can cause economic inefficiency and 
uncertainty;78 and third, since state legislatures and insurance 
departments regulate insurance contracts, there is little need for 
the courts to apply strong doctrines against insurers. On the other 
hand, according to the doctrine’s supporters, the strong contra 
proferentem rule discourages ambiguity, corrects unfairness, 
redistributes wealth, and promotes uniformity of meaning in 
mass-produced contracts for both insurers and insureds using 
boilerplate-ridden insurance policies.79 Randall’s fears in this area 
are based on a perceived practical difference between the strong 
contra proferentem doctrine and the normal version of that rule. 
This article will evidence, however, that many states use the 
strong version of the doctrine, that states are generally consistent 
in their approach, and that both the strong and normal contra 
proferentem doctrines are largely protective of consumers because 
of a general lack of extrinsic evidence surrounding insurance 
policies.  
                                                          
the ambiguity by considering extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ 
mutual intent.”); 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK 
ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 14–18 (15th ed. 2010) (contra 
proferentem should only apply when an ambiguity cannot be resolved by 
extrinsic evidence). 
75 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 121 (citing cases applying 
law from New York, Washington, North Dakota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Arkansas, Maryland, and New Mexico); see generally 2 COUCH ON 
INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 22:22 (2010) (detailing the different approaches 
to the contra proferentem doctrine in different jurisdictions).  
76 See infra Part IV(A)(2).  
77 WINDT, supra note 74, at § 603. 
78 Rappaport, supra note 30, at 202–06. 
79 David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard 
Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 484–85 (2009). 
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B. The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
The reasonable expectations doctrine, propounded by 
Professor Keeton in 1970 to protect consumers, is simple in its 
pure form: the consumer’s reasonable expectation of coverage 
trumps policy language to the contrary.80 In the ensuing forty 
years, the doctrine has been debated, praised, and defamed, but it 
has never been widely followed as proposed. By 2000, most 
courts that had experimented with the doctrine, fearing 
inconsistency and unpredictability, narrowed it to follow the 
insured’s reasonable expectations only when construing either 
ambiguous or unconscionable terms against the insurer, or when 
applying waiver, estoppel, election, and contract reformation.81 
Since the insured’s reasonable expectations only trumped policy 
language that was ambiguous, unconscionable, or otherwise 
inequitable, the doctrine had been so modified as to become 
unrecognizable just three decades after its proposal. By 2008, 
courts had moved even further from the pure doctrine, with only 
Alaska and Hawaii applying Keeton’s once-attractive approach.82 
                                                          
80 See Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the 
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 
729, 733 (2000) (citing Keeton, supra note 6). 
81 Id. at 735–47; See, e.g., Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 
2010) (using the reasonable expectations doctrine after an ambiguity was 
shown). 
82 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 111–18. Hawaii’s 
approach, however, does not appear to be as pure as Keeton’s original 
proposal; in describing the law of contract interpretation, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court refers to various contract principles that limit the scope of the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, not the least of which is that reasonable 
expectations are found not with the insured, but in the plain language of the 
contract terms. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated that, “It is well settled in 
Hawai’i that ‘the objectively reasonable expectations of policyholders and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations.’ These ‘reasonable expectations’ are derived from 
the insurance policy itself, which is ‘subject to the general rules of contract 
construction.’ This involves construing the policy ‘according to the entirety of 
its terms and conditions,’ and ‘the terms themselves ... should be interpreted 
according to their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common speech unless 
it appears from the policy that a different meaning was intended.’ ‘Because 
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and are premised on standard 
forms prepared by the insurer’s attorneys, we have long subscribed to the 
principle that they must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and any 
ambiguities must be resolved against the insurer.’” Del Monte Fresh Produce 
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Thus, the reasonable expectations doctrine has become, 
for most courts, merely an expansion of the insurance-tailored 
contra proferentem rule: where there is an ambiguous term, the 
court favors the insured by ruling according to her reasonable 
interpretation of the language.83 As demonstrated below, Randall 
gives a good overview of this doctrine’s history, but even that 
history shows that the doctrine is neither pervasive nor helpful to 
consumers.  
 
C. Tort-Based Bad Faith Actions Flowing from the Insurer’s 
Breach 
“Bad faith” claims arising out of insurance policy disputes 
are meant to deter insurers from treating their insureds unfairly, 
particularly since so many claims involve catastrophic events in 
the lives of insureds, and to make insureds whole for injuries 
suffered due to their insurer’s improper actions. These claims, 
based in the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
found in any contract, come in many forms — from breach of 
duty to settle to failure to pay a claim.84 There is a further 
division between first- and third-party claims: third-party claims 
are for liability insurance, in which the insurer and the insured 
                                                          
(Haw.), Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 183 P.3d 734, 745 (Haw. 2007) 
(citations and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Alaska seems to follow a 
more insured-centered approach, asking whether, from the perspective of the 
insureds claiming coverage, the terms of the contract would have provided 
coverage for the loss incurred. See C.P. ex rel. M.L. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 
P.2d 1216, 1223-25 (Alaska 2000).  
83 Perhaps the best explanation of the modern view is from the Michigan 
Supreme Court: “The rule of reasonable expectations clearly has no application 
to unambiguous contracts. That is, one’s alleged “reasonable expectations” 
cannot supersede the clear language of a contract. Therefore, if this rule has 
any meaning, it can only be that, if there is more than one way to reasonably 
interpret a contract, i.e., the contract is ambiguous, and one of these 
interpretations is in accord with the reasonable expectations of the insured, 
this interpretation should prevail. However, this is saying no more than that, if 
a contract is ambiguous and the parties’ intent cannot be discerned from 
extrinsic evidence, the contract should be interpreted against the insurer. In 
other words, when its application is limited to ambiguous contracts, the rule of 
reasonable expectations is just a surrogate for the rule of construing against the 
drafter.” Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 664 N.W.2d 776, 786–87 (Mich. 
2003). 
84 See generally, RONALD D. KENT & WILLIAM T. BARKER, NEW 
APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 2010). 
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are “on the same side” against the third party. These claims often 
arise in automobile, homeowner’s, commercial general liability, 
professional liability, and directors and officers insurance. They 
usually involve a duty to reasonably defend the insured against a 
third party, a duty to reasonably settle with the third party or 
insured (who will then settle with the third party), and a duty to 
indemnify the insured if the case is lost. First-party claims are 
between an insured, who makes the claim for herself, and the 
insurer.  
Third-party bad faith claims have been available for a 
very long time, sounding both in contract and in tort.85 This early 
acceptance of third-party claims by the states was likely due to 
the fiduciary, “same-team” relationship between the insured and 
the insurer,86 the ease with which insurers could manipulate 
insureds to pay part of the claim,87 and the enormous liability and 
litigation uncertainty to which insureds are exposed in third-
party cases.88 All states recognize the third-party bad faith claim, 
with some allowing it in tort and others in contract.89    
First-party claims, on the other hand, are relatively new. 
Of the forty-nine states that have addressed the issue, most states 
(and a continually growing number of them) allow for tort-based 
claims, a substantial minority allow expanded tort-like damages 
with the cause of action based in contract, and only five reject 
                                                          
85 Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914) (seminal case 
finding an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts); 
Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal. 1958) (allowing 
for bad faith in tort or contract, at the plaintiff’s election, for third-party 
refusal to settle cases); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1042 (Cal. 
1973) (finding first-party bad faith against fire insurer and allowing for tort 
damages); see generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Common-
Sense Construction of Unfair Claims Settlement Statutes: Restoring the Good 
Faith in Bad Faith, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1477, 1482–86 (2009). 
86 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799–801 (Utah 1985) 
(noting that, in third-party situations, the insurer is a fiduciary to the insured 
because the insurer and insured are on the same side against the third-party 
claimant, while in the first-party situation, the relationship between the 
insured and the insurer is more adversarial). 
87 See JOHN M. BJORKMAN, ET AL., 3 LAW AND PRAC. OF INS. COVERAGE 
LITIG. § 29:19 (2010). 
88 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 10.03[D][3] 
(illustrating the uncertainty and possible liability by giving an example of a 
homeowner whose guest, an outfielder for the Red Sox, slips on a banana peel 
and suffers a career-threatening injury). 
89 BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 29:20. 
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first-party claims altogether.90  
In addition to these common-law remedies for bad faith, 
states are active in passing consumer-protective legislation, much 
of which provides for attorneys’ fees, interest, and even penalties 
against insurers who, for certain types of insurance, act in bad 
faith toward consumers.91 Legislatures are generally not shy 
about stepping into the traditional realm of common law contract 
if they find something that demands change. The extension of 
bad faith remedies in the last few decades is another reminder 
that legislatures are addressing the insured-insurer relationship. 
In other words, Professor Randall is incorrect in saying that 
remedies for insurer bad faith have shrunken recently; courts and 
legislatures alike have actually been expanding this protection. 
IV. Professor Randall’s Proposal 
This section analyzes and critiques Professor Randall’s 
recent proposal that judges stop using contract law, the focus of 
which is parties’ intent, and instead use legislative goals to 
interpret insurance policies. In her words, “[a]cknowledgment of 
legislative and administrative involvement through mandated 
provisions and policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus 
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating regulatory 
goals.”92 She argues that it is necessary to move away from 
contract law and toward regulatory goals because consumers are 
being harmed by courts’ supposedly recent consumer-damaging 
movement away from the reasonable expectations doctrine, the 
strong version of the contra proferentem doctrine, and the 
availability of bad faith actions in tort. This problem of declining 
consumer protection, she says, comes against the sensitive 
background of insurance policies as adhesive, standardized 
instruments into which neither the insurer nor the insured can 
insert preferred language (and whose contents reflect legislative 
                                                          
90 STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS LIABILITY & DAMAGES § 
2:15 (2010). 
91 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-208 (West 2010) (allowing both 
penalties and attorneys’ fees for various types of insurance); GA. CODE ANN. § 
33-4-6 (West 2010) (allowing penalties and attorneys’ fees for bad faith claim 
denials); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155 (West 2010) (allowing penalties and 
attorney’s fees for unreasonable denial or delay in paying claim); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 22:656–22:658 (2010) (allowing penalty, interest, and attorneys’ 
fees). See generally ASHLEY, supra note 90, at § 9:15 (2010). 
92 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 135. 
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mandates rather than the intent of the parties). The solution to 
this problem, she argues, is for courts to make public policy and 
legislative intent — rather than contract law — the framework 
for determining insurance policy disputes.  
By analyzing Professor Randall’s proposal, this article 
demonstrates that (1) courts have not recently shifted away from 
consumer-protective doctrines; (2) notwithstanding adhesion, 
mandated content, and pre-approval of forms, there is plenty of 
room left for contract law and statutory regulations to 
consistently coexist in insurance; (3) consumers are in fact better 
protected than ever by state legislatures — whose job it is to 
dictate public policy; and (4) even if there is a problem with 
consumer protection, it should not be addressed through narrow 
adjudicatory processes but through the broad legislative process 
— which can best function against a backdrop of predictable 
judicial interpretations of law rather than unpredictable judicial 
beliefs of what legislatures desire. Particularly, the 
implementation of Professor Randall’s proposal would lead to 
both judicial and economic unpredictability, violations of 
democratic and republican principles, and impractical, consumer-
harming uncertainty and litigation.  
As a threshold matter, even though she is at times vague 
on this point, it is assumed that Randall advocates some greater 
exercise of judicial power than courts currently use. She does say, 
rightly, that:  
 
The normal exercise of judicial power permits a 
court to determine that policy provisions are 
ambiguous, deceptive, unfair, or contrary to 
public policy within the meaning of the statute 
and to construe the provisions to avoid statutory 
violations occasioned by an insurance regulator’s 
approval, accomplishing the legislative objective 
of protecting insurance consumers.93  
 
This, of course, is merely a statement of what courts already do. 
A call for courts to start better protecting consumers surely 
promotes judicial action beyond the status quo. Simply 
suggesting that statutes be followed is not the purpose of her 
proposal. Rather, she proposes interpretation based on vague 
                                                          
93 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 141 (emphasis added). 
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“policy goals,” not just written statutes and the common law. 
A. Demise of Consumer-Protective Common Law Doctrines? 
Professor Randall sees a problem in what she considers to 
be a judicial move away from consumer-protective doctrines —
particularly the strong contra proferentem doctrine, the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, and the availability of bad faith 
actions in tort for an insurer’s inappropriate actions.94 As 
authority, Randall cites numerous cases from various 
jurisdictions, which, she says, prove that courts have recently 
decided to no longer treat insurance policies as special, and 
instead to treat them as ordinary contracts subject to ordinary 
contract principles.95 However, on closer examination, many of 
the cases she cites either do not lend support to her argument or 
actually articulate some or all of the principles she says are 
dead.96   
Additionally, many of the cases she uses are from federal 
courts, which by definition have no binding precedential 
                                                          
94 Id. at 109–10. 
95 Id. at 110, n. 9. 
96 See, e.g., Kessler v. Shimp, 640 S.E.2d 822, 824–25 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting McLeod v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 444 S.E.2d 487, 491–92) 
(advocating a strong contra proferentem doctrine, which does not allow for 
extrinsic evidence before construing ambiguities against the insurer); Axis 
Reinsurance Co. v. Melancon, 2007 WL 60968, at *3 (E.D. La. 2007) (simply 
stating that, where an insurance company complies with statutes and 
regulations, it can provide for clearly-stated exclusions in maritime insurance 
contracts); Federated Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vaughn, 961 So.2d 816, 818–19 
(Ala. 2007) (where a statute clearly gives a right to insurers to deny uninsured 
motorist coverage, the insurer has the right to act on such a provision in its 
policy); ABT Bldg. Prod. Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 472 
F.3d 99, 116 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating the strict contra proferentem doctrine 
under North Carolina law); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Riley, 899 A.2d 819, 
833 (Md. 2006) (where an insurance policy is unambiguous in light of what a 
reasonable person would understand by reading it, the job of the court is 
finished); Moscarillo v. Prof’l Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 921 A.2d 245, 251 (Md. 
2007) (quoting Litz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 695 A.2d 566, 569 (Md. 
1997)) (“An insurance contract, like any other contract, is measured by its 
terms unless a statute, a regulation, or public policy is violated thereby”; the 
court, at 571, also recognized the contra proferentem rule as used in St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pryseski, 438 A.2d 282, 288 (Md. 1981), which allows 
the rule only after extrinsic evidence is allowed; thus, Maryland seems to be 
one state that truly does apply ordinary contractual principles to insurance 
policies). 
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authority to abandon or modify state courts’ consumer 
protections. Further, most of the cases cited are merely persuasive 
authority and would be of little help to her argument if they were 
binding authority. In some cases, courts give lip service to 
traditional contractual principles only to go on to apply 
insurance-specific doctrines meant to protect consumers. Thus, in 
many of the states with which she finds fault, courts state that 
they will apply ordinary contract principles in one sentence but 
then invoke consumer-protective doctrines in the next.97 In her 
discussion, Randall does not show that any specific state, recently 
or otherwise, has moved away from consumer protection. 
Further, she does not demonstrate that the differences in 
consumer protection across states mean that state courts across 
the country are generally abandoning consumers. The opposite is 
true: consumers are more protected today than ever, thanks to 
both legislative and judicial action. 
This section addresses each of Randall’s three doctrinal 
concerns in turn, illustrating that both the courts and legislatures 
are well aware of consumers, as illustrated by the existence and 
use of the three doctrines she discusses, in addition to the doctrine 
of unconscionability and numerous statutory protections. 
1.  Strong Contra Proferentem Doctrine 
Randall asserts that her claim is immediately necessary 
because courts have recently begun applying ordinary contract 
law in resolving insurance policy disputes by using contra 
proferentem only as a last resort.98 To support this claim, she cites 
cases from New York, Washington, North Dakota, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Maryland, and New Mexico that turn 
out, under close examination, to be of little help to her thesis both 
because these states are internally consistent and because the 
cases themselves do not repudiate consumer protection. These 
cases do not recently reject consumer protection because (1) the 
current contra proferentem rules in these jurisdictions are not 
“recent;” (2) some of them actually provide peculiarly strong 
                                                          
97 As a clear example, see Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s of London, 600 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 2010), quoted in Part III(A). 
There, the court states that it will apply traditional contract principles, but 
then goes on to articulate the strong version of the contra proferentem doctrine. 
Pendergest-Holt, 600 F.3d at 569. 
98 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 120. 
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protection for consumers; and (3) even in those jurisdictions 
without the strong rule, contra proferentem acts as the strong rule 
in most cases because there is no extrinsic evidence to apply.  
Randall begins with a case applying New York law,99 one 
that oddly did not involve contra proferentem or the construction 
of language against the drafter. There, the Seventh Circuit found 
that a shipyard corporation had to pay continuing benefits to a 
worker harmed while on the job because it did not notify the 
secondary insurer of its obligation for some five months after the 
primary insurer’s insolvency and the Department of Labor’s 
notification to the shipyard of the corporation’s continuing 
duties.100 Under the policy’s plain terms, the court found that 
New York law applied and precluded coverage.101 In its 
background section, the court did state that extrinsic evidence 
cannot be used unless there is an ambiguity in the contract,102 
perhaps implying that the contra proferentem doctrine could not 
apply until extrinsic evidence had been explored. However, the 
court did not have a chance to apply this possibility because 
neither party claimed that the contract was ambiguous. Indeed, 
the Seventh Circuit had no authority to move New York law 
away from consumer protection even if it had tried. Due to the 
case’s irrelevance to her thesis, Professor Randall’s purpose for 
using it is unclear.103 A better summary of the New York law of 
contra proferentem is seen in the case In re Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. 
Co. (Malatino),104 which states that “[g]enerally, ‘policies of 
insurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
strictly against the insurer.’”105 It also states that, “[w]here 
ambiguity exists as to coverage, doubt should be resolved in favor 
of the insured.”106 These cases paint a much more liberal usage of 
contra proferentem in New York than Randall implies; indeed, 
the cases indicate that courts are to liberally construe insurance 
                                                          
99 St. Paul Travelers Cos., Inc. v. Corn Island Shipyard, Inc., 495 F.3d 376 
(7th Cir. 2007) (applying New York law). 
100 Id. at 379, 384–87. 
101 Id. at 386. 
102 Id. at 383. 
103 Id. at 384. 
104 75 A.D.3d 967 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). 
105 Id. at 967-69 (quoting Penna v. Fed. Ins. Co., 28 A.D.3d 731, 731, (N.Y. 
2006)) (also citing Gov’t Empls. Ins. Co. v. Kligler, 366 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 
1977); Turkow v. Erie Ins. Co., 20 A.D.3d 649, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)).  
106 Id. (citing Handelsman v. Sea Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 1258 (N.Y. 1994); 
and Penna, 28 A.D.3d at 731). 
Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/23/2011  3:39:00 PM 
326 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 23:3 
policies in favor of the insured. Finally, it is worth noting that in 
Malatino,107  Penna,108 and other New York cases,109 the court did 
not resort to extrinsic evidence until after construing an 
ambiguity in favor of the insured, even though some federal 
courts applying New York law have used extrinsic evidence in 
their analysis.110 Thus, New York law has been stable and 
protective of consumers for a very long time. 
After New York, Randall moves on to Washington, 
implying that courts there have recently repudiated the strong 
contra proferentem doctrine; she cites Willing v. Cmty. Ass’n 
Underwriters of Am., Inc.111 In that case, the court did not rely on 
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent; rather, it construed the 
contract against the insurer without reference to extrinsic 
evidence — even though it stated that the general contra 
proferentem rule in Washington would allow for extrinsic 
evidence before construing the contract against the insurer.112 
There was no extrinsic evidence to apply in Willing, as is often 
true in policy disputes, because “contracts of insurance ordinarily 
consist either of provisions required by statute or of preprinted, 
industry-drafted forms that are rarely subject to the sort of 
negotiation that would produce useful extrinsic evidence.”113 
Therefore, the law in Washington is that if an ambiguity is 
detected, extrinsic evidence (which will likely be available only if 
the insured is sophisticated enough to actually negotiate, or at 
                                                          
107 Malatino, 75 A.D.3d at 970. 
108 Penna, 28 A.D.3d at 731–32. 
109 Nassau Plaza Assocs., L.P. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 74 A.D.3d 
1159 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Markotsis v. Zurich Ins. Co., No. 4723/07, 2008 
WL 2446332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 15, 2008); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat’l 
Cas. Co., 47 A.D.3d 770, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citing Hartol Prods. Corp. 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 47 N.E.2d 687, 690 (N.Y. 1943)); NIACC, LLC 
v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 51 A.D.3d 883, 884 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citing 
Mostow v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 668 N.E.2d 392, 423 (N.Y. 1996), which held 
that “ambiguities in an insurance policy should be construed in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer” and did not apply extrinsic evidence before 
using the contra proferentem doctrine). 
110 See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Group Inc. v. New England Ins. Co., 225 
F.3d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing other federal cases to support the notion 
that extrinsic evidence is to be used before applying contra proferentem). 
111 No. C06-1357RSL, 2007 WL 1991038 (W.D. Wash. July 5, 2007). 
112 Id. at *2. 
113 Andres v. Am. Std. Ins. Co. of Wis., 134 P.3d 1061, 1063 (Or. App. 
2006). Extrinsic evidence in insurance cases is, as Randall recognizes in note 41 
of her article, rare. Randall, supra note 2, at 121 n. 41. 
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least debate or explain, policy terms) is allowed before the contra 
proferentem rule is applied. However, since extrinsic evidence is 
normally unavailable as to the parties’ intent, the contra 
proferentem rule in Washington usually functions like the strong 
contra proferentem rule in resolving ambiguities in favor of 
insureds — particularly because Washington courts first look to 
the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of undefined terms 
rather than the parties’ particular meaning, providing more 
opportunity to the court to find ambiguity since the insurer’s 
specialized meaning is not permitted.114 Additionally, the rule is 
even more favorable to consumers in certain contexts: “The rule 
strictly construing ambiguities in favor of the insured applies 
with added force to exclusionary clauses which seek to limit 
policy coverage.”115 Finally, even if Washington’s rule is a slight 
practical departure from the strong contra proferentem rule, it is 
not a recent departure that the state legislature has had time, if 
desired, to address.116 
Professor Randall also implies that North Dakota common 
law has recently moved away from the strong contra proferentem 
doctrine, citing Sloan v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., which 
used the doctrine in the context of an ERISA plan—a context 
governed by federal law.117 There, the federal district court, 
which was reviewing a Social Security Administration decision 
de novo, noted that “[t]he district court may admit evidence 
outside the record in a case involving the denial of ERISA 
benefits if the participant shows good cause.”118 While contra 
proferentem might not be as strong in North Dakota courts when 
evaluating administrative adjudicatory pronouncements over 
ERISA plans, North Dakota generally has adhered to a strong 
                                                          
114 See Holden v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 239 P.3d 344, 347 (Wash. 
2010). 
115 Am. Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 854 P.2d 622, 625 (Wash. 1993), aff’d en 
banc, 865 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1994). 
116 See, e.g., Shotwell v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 208, 212 
(Wash. 1978) (applying extrinsic evidence and stating the general rule that 
ambiguities should be construed against insurer). 
117 433 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048 (D.N.D. 2006), aff’d, 475 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 
2007) (if ERISA plan is deemed ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be 
considered; “any ambiguities should be construed against drafter only as a last 
step”). 
118 Id. at 1038–39 (citing Ferrari v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 278 
F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2002)).  
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version of contra proferentem in insurance policy disputes.119 The 
extremely limited and federally-controlled area of ERISA should 
not guide, and it is no indicator of, North Dakota’s stance on 
insurance policy interpretation generally. 
Next, Randall cites a New Jersey case, McNeilab, Inc. v. 
North River Ins. Co.,120 as an example. In a federal decision more 
than twenty years old, the court in McNeilab simply noted that, 
while the general rule in New Jersey is to strictly construe 
insurance contracts against the insurer, large, sophisticated 
insureds (here, the enormous Johnson & Johnson) should not be 
subject to the same favorable treatment.121 Indeed, the general 
New Jersey rule is as follows:  
 
If the terms are not clear, but instead are 
ambiguous, they are construed against the 
insurer and in favor of the insured, in order to 
give effect to the insured’s reasonable 
expectations. This is so even if a ‘close reading’ 
might yield a different outcome, or if a 
‘painstaking’ analysis would have alerted the 
insured that there would be no coverage.122  
 
This combination of reasonable expectations with the ambiguity 
doctrine offers particularly strong protection for New Jersey 
                                                          
119 Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 599, 602 (N.D. 1998) 
(“‘[A] term in an insurance policy should be construed ‘to mean what a 
reasonable person in the position of the insured would think it meant.’ 
‘Limitations or exclusions from broad coverage must be clear and explicit.’ 
‘[W]hen the language of an insurance policy is clear and explicit, the language 
should not be strained in order to impose liability on the insurer.’ However, 
any ambiguity or reasonable doubt as to the meaning of an insurance policy is 
strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. ‘If the 
language in an insurance contract will support an interpretation which will 
impose liability on the insurer and one which will not, the former 
interpretation will be adopted.’”) (internal citations omitted). Note that there is 
no mention or use of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent at the time of 
contract formation. However, there may be certain instances in which extrinsic 
evidence is allowed: “[I]n rare [insurance] cases, parol evidence may be used to 
decipher the intention of the parties.” Hanneman v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 575 
N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1998).  
120 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986). 
121 Id. at 546. 
122 Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 997 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 2010) (internal citations 
omitted).  
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consumers.123 However, at least in the context of coverage 
disputes between sophisticated insurance companies, extrinsic 
evidence is allowed.124 
Next, Professor Randall uses Pennsylvania law as an 
example, citing Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pa. Lumbermens 
Mut. Ins. Co.125 The court in that case did not apply contra 
proferentem.126 The general Pennsylvania rule is: “Where a 
provision of a policy is ambiguous [(meaning that it is reasonably 
susceptible to different constructions and capable of being 
understood in more than one sense)], the policy provision is to be 
construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”127 
Although this definition does not preclude the use of extrinsic 
evidence, such use is rare outside the context of sophisticated 
insureds.128 Further, the principles found in Pennsylvania’s rules 
have been around for many years, suggesting that regulators have 
had plenty of time to recognize and resolve problems with 
contract interpretation that may harm consumers.129 
Professor Randall cites Arkansas law next, namely State 
Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality.130 
                                                          
123 See Doto v. Russo, 659 A.2d 1371, 1376–77 (N.J. 1995) (giving clear 
explanation of full protection afforded by the mixed doctrines of reasonable 
expectations and contra proferentem). 
124 Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 
1289 (N.J. 2008) (stating that extrinsic evidence can be used in the context of 
one insurance company suing another over meaning of insured company’s 
policy; court went on to use history of disputed term to inform interpretation). 
For more on the special contra proferentem application for sophisticated 
insureds and insurer disputes, see COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 7, at § 
22:24. 
125 641 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
126 Id. 
127 Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 
(Pa. 1999); see also Kropa v. Gateway Ford, 974 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2009). 
128 See, e.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192 
(Pa. 2001) (allowing trade usage of term, to inform court’s decision as between 
Sunbeam Corp. and its insurer, even though contract was unambiguous); 
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (allowing 
extrinsic evidence to inform the meaning of terms of an agreement between 
sophisticated parties); see also 1 BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 1:11 
(noting that contra proferentem rule in Pennsylvania is usually strict against 
insurer, unless insured has negotiated terms of contract). 
129 See, e.g., Brams v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 A. 855, 856 (Pa. 1930) (stating 
general rules of contra proferentem). 
130 258 S.W.3d 736 (Ark. 2007); see also Gilstrap v. Jackson, 601 S.W.2d 
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There, the court noted that the general rule of insurance policy 
interpretation was that any ambiguities would be “construed 
liberally in favor of the insured”; the holding went on to recognize 
that “an exception to this general rule [is] where disputed 
extrinsic evidence is offered to establish what the ambiguous 
language means.”131 However, the Arkansas courts sometimes use 
extrinsic evidence to create an ambiguity, which can then be 
construed against the insurer.132 This consumer-friendly option 
would normally be precluded by the more general rule that an 
ambiguity only arises if two reasonable interpretations can be 
made when the term is construed in its “plain, ordinary, popular 
sense.”133 Additionally, as is common of insurance contract 
disputes elsewhere, many cases in Arkansas do not use extrinsic 
evidence before applying the contra proferentem doctrine.134 It 
appears that courts either use the doctrine loosely to justify their 
holdings, or more likely have no extrinsic evidence to apply. 
Finally, Arkansas is not a state that has only recently repudiated 
the strong contra proferentem doctrine or created uncertainty as 
to the rule; as with other states, the legislature has had many 
years to resolve any problems it sees with courts’ protection of 
consumers.135  
Randall also uses Maryland law as an example, citing 
Collier v. MD-Individual Practice Ass’n.136 The Collier court 
stated that, in Maryland, “[w]e do not follow the rule, adopted in 
some states, that insurance policies are to be construed most 
                                                          
270 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980); Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 57 S.W.3d 165 
(Ark. 2001). 
131 State Auto, 258 S.W.3d at 743. 
132 McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc., 268 S.W.3d 890 
(Ark. 2007). 
133 Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 16 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Ark. 2000); 
accord Hon. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Contract: When Is 
Contract Interpretation A Legal Question and When Is It A Fact Question?, 5 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 81 (2010). 
134 See, e.g., Norris, 16 S.W.3d at 246 (where mother of boy who injured 
appellant’s son — a very sympathetic plaintiff — was found to be covered by 
insurer’s duty to defend and provide liability coverage due to ambiguity); 
Gawrieh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 117 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) 
(finding ambiguity in night club’s liability policy, thereby requiring partial 
coverage for shooting death and injuries). 
135 See, e.g., Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. W. Gen. Ins. Co., 816 S.W.2d 638 
(Ark. Ct. App. 1991). 
136 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992). 
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strongly against the insurer.”137 Thus, the rule is that when 
ambiguity is still present after the court considers extrinsic 
evidence, the term will be construed against the drafter. This rule 
seems to be followed in both first-party138 and third-party 
coverage.139 Even though most cases of ambiguity will have little 
extrinsic evidence to apply, Maryland’s rule is not an iteration of 
the strong contra proferentem doctrine. Yet, contrary to Randall’s 
inference, nothing about Maryland’s rule is a “recent” departure 
from the strong contra proferentem doctrine; its rule has been 
consistent for more than one hundred years.140 Further, as noted 
in subsection IV(a)(3), infra, Maryland’s legislature is well aware 
of consumers. 
Finally, Randall uses the New Mexico case of Bird v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. as an example of courts’ 
repudiation of the strong contra proferentem doctrine.141 There, 
extrinsic evidence was allowed to inform an ambiguity before the 
contract was construed against the insurer.142 However, one key 
to modern policy interpretation in New Mexico is that, as in 
Arkansas, the courts follow an express policy of allowing extrinsic 
evidence to create an ambiguity that then benefits the consumer. 
When a rule allows the creation of ambiguities in a contract that 
is clear and unambiguous within its four corners, and when those 
ambiguities will, by the rule’s definition, favor the insured, that 
rule provides a protection to consumers that even the strong 
version of contra proferentem — which applies only when an 
ambiguity arises from the four corners of the document — does 
not provide. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied this 
doctrine in Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,143 in which 
nothing within the four corners of the insurance policy was 
ambiguous.144 The policy clearly excluded the plaintiff from 
recovering a large sum of money from her parents’ automobile 
                                                          
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CSX Corp., 131 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 
1997) (concerning life insurance policy). 
139 See, e.g., Chang v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 897 A.2d 854, 858 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2006) (concerning liability policy). 
140 See Planters’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Deford, 38 Md. 382, 403 (1873); see also 
Pac. Indem. Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486, 489 (Md. 1985). 
141 Bird v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 165 P.3d 343 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2007); see also Rummel v. Lexington Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 970 (N.M. 1997). 
142 Bird, 165 P.3d at 347. 
143 12 P.3d 960 (N.M. 2000). 
144 Id. at 965. 
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insurer because at the time of her accident she was both married 
and living away from home, but the court allowed an ambiguity 
to be created by way of extrinsic evidence and then construed 
that ambiguity in favor of the insured.145 Even in many states 
with “strong” contra proferentem rules, the plaintiff’s case would 
have ended when the court saw how clear the policy language 
was. Thus, even though ambiguities arising out of the four 
corners of the document can be resolved by extrinsic evidence — 
something that weakens the strong contra proferentem doctrine 
— the fact that ambiguities can be created by extrinsic evidence 
in the first instance allows the contra proferentem doctrine to 
favor the insured in situations otherwise precluding recovery. 
Finally, in addition to this strong protection, New Mexico courts 
have been using their version of the doctrine for some time.146  
Assuming that Randall cites the cases most favorable to 
her argument, her claim that the courts are moving away from 
the protection of the contra proferentem doctrine, particularly 
that they are moving away rapidly or recently, is simply invalid. 
In fact, even the normal contra proferentem doctrine, which 
allows extrinsic evidence to clarify an ambiguity before 
construing the contract against the insured, almost certainly 
protects nearly all insureds as much as the strong contra 
proferentem doctrine because, given the standardized application 
process, there is little or no evidence of the parties’ intent for 
courts to apply before favoring the insured; additionally, even 
where extrinsic evidence is allowed, insureds often want it 
admitted because it will favor them (or at least reflect their 
intent), either by its clarification or its reinforcement of 
ambiguity, which will almost certainly be resolved in their 
favor.147  
                                                          
145 Id. at 965–66. 
146 For a discussion of the history of New Mexico courts’ usage of extrinsic 
evidence to inform ambiguities, see Jaramillo v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 
871 P.2d 1343, 1347 (1994) (stating that the Supreme Court moved away from 
the four corners approach in 1987 for contracts generally, and that in 1991 and 
1993 it had specifically applied the new rule to insurance contracts; note that 
the court, even in 1994, recognized that extrinsic evidence was to be used to 
“determine whether the parties’ words are ambiguous,” thereby leaving the 
door open for courts to create ambiguities out of consideration of extrinsic 
evidence.). 
147 See STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 4.08[E] 
(“In insurance cases, the theoretically disadvantaged often have more effective 
weapons at their disposal and may argue for the admission of extrinsic 
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Even in states applying the normal contra proferentem 
doctrine, extrinsic evidence is only remotely possible, but 
certainly not a necessary, antecedent to applying the doctrine. 
This is evidenced by the many cases that, although decided in a 
state allowing extrinsic evidence, do not hold that such evidence 
may be part of the equation; such economy of words is likely 
brought on because in those cases there is no extrinsic evidence as 
to the parties’ mutual intent. Finally, if there is extrinsic evidence 
of mutual intent, it would be at the very least an indication that 
the insured understood what she was purchasing and thus is not 
the passive, hapless consumer that the strong version of the 
doctrine is meant to protect. 
2.  Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
Professor Randall attempts to prove that the pure form of 
Professor Keeton’s148 reasonable expectations doctrine, which 
allows an insured’s reasonable expectations to trump even clear 
policy language, has all but disappeared, even while failing to 
show that it ever held much sway in its original form. She states, 
“[t]he doctrine of reasonable expectations has given way to firm 
judicial pronouncements about enforcing unambiguous policies 
as written.”149 Actually, the reasonable expectations doctrine 
never took hold in most states in its pure form, was confusing and 
uncertain in jurisdictions that did use it, and is commonly seen as 
a failed and untenable doctrine.150 Today, as Professor Randall 
states, a majority of jurisdictions apply reasonable expectations 
as a complement to the contra proferentem doctrine; after an 
ambiguity is shown, the reasonable expectations of the insured 
will trump the insurer’s explanation of the policy’s terms either 
before or after the use of extrinsic evidence to clarify the 
ambiguity.151 Thus, while it is true that the pure form of the 
                                                          
evidence.”). 
148 Keeton, supra note 6. 
149 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 111 (emphasis added). 
150 See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 824 (1990) (stating 
that only sixteen states had adopted the doctrine, some of which never 
accepted its pure form); Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable 
Expectations after Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425 
(1998) (concluding that problems inherent in the doctrine itself account for its 
failure to develop into a coherent, principled body of law). 
151 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 114–15. 
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reasonable expectations doctrine does not currently exist in 
almost all states, the doctrine was never popular, rarely 
predictable, and not even theoretically justified.152 There is little 
wonder why most states that ever used it have rejected it. 
The doctrine in its pure form would appear to be helpful 
to consumers, but it would almost certainly harm them by 
contributing to inconsistency and unpredictability that would 
raise transaction costs, including litigation costs.153 That is, the 
doctrine would harm consumers by creating uncertainty; 
moreover, insurance underwriters would not know whether their 
clear, unambiguous contractual language — although approved 
by the insurance department of both the state in question and 
those of other states — would be held up in court.154 This 
uncertainty would lead to higher premiums and/or narrower 
coverage since insurers would have to spend more time and 
money negotiating terms, understanding and recording the 
consumer’s expectations from the outset, litigating disputes, and 
paying attorneys’ fees.  
Further, with judges making ad hoc decisions based on 
each plaintiff’s potentially reasonable expectations, precedent 
could hardly guide present or future decisions. Indeed, each 
successful plaintiff, with different traits and under divergent 
circumstances, could be seen as creating a new standard. As one 
commentator observed on the economic disincentives such a 
doctrine would create: “[i]nsurers must know with certainty that 
contract language will be judicially respected. Absent such 
certainty, only the most cavalier insurer would attempt to write 
business.”155 With such uncertainty, insurers would have to begin 
                                                          
152 Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 296 (1998) (noting that insureds 
are unlikely to develop specific expectations from interactions with their 
agents and that insureds generally misunderstand basic coverage and 
exclusions anyway; thus, the theoretical justification for the doctrine that 
insureds have expectations when they purchase coverage is unjustified). 
153 For one of the many economic arguments against the pure reasonable 
expectations doctrine, see Stephen J. Ware, A Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1462, 1476–93 (1989) (showing that 
the reasonable expectations doctrine is harmful from an economic standpoint, 
since it would decrease predictability and certainty, thereby leading to higher 
transaction costs — including court costs). 
154 Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 150, at 431–32. 
155 Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy 
Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385 (1985). 
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charging premiums that accurately reflected the risk to them, 
which would necessarily include the risk that a court might 
determine a particular plaintiff’s expectations to be reasonable. 
In short, to remain solvent, insurers would either increase rates or 
narrow the breadth of coverage offered – both exacerbating the 
effects on a likely already-vulnerable consumer.156  
Additionally, since the pure doctrine would in a sense call 
the entire contract into question in every instance, and since each 
plaintiff would offer a fact-intensive problem of whether she in 
fact had a reasonable expectation of coverage at the time she 
signed her application, transaction costs in the form of attorney’s 
fees and court costs would skyrocket, further raising rates.157  
Thus, the pure reasonable expectations doctrine was a 
failure from the start, especially from a consumer standpoint, and 
nearly all courts have rightly rejected it or applied it only after 
ambiguity is shown. Given its anti-consumer effects, Professor 
Randall’s advocacy of the doctrine is peculiar to say the least. 
3. Bad Faith Actions Sounding in Tort 
Professor Randall claims that courts have recently begun 
shifting bad faith from a cause of action in tort to one arising 
under contract alone; as a result, she asserts, insureds in many 
third-party cases (and some first-party cases) suffer because they 
can only recover consequential damages if they are covered by 
the insurance policy; whereas, if they were allowed a private 
action in tort, they would be able to recover for consequential 
damages regardless of whether they were covered by the 
insurance policy.158 There are numerous problems with her 
position. First, courts have been largely consistent over the years, 
steadily finding the bad faith cause of action to sound in contract, 
tort, or both. Second, in most states, remedies are largely the same 
regardless of whether the cause of action sounds in tort or in 
contract. Finally, the protection from bad faith has in fact been 
expanding lately, not shrinking, and consumers are heavily 
defended both by statute and common law.  
Professor Randall does not indicate how a tort-based 
rather than a flexible, contract-based cause of action would be so 
favorable to insureds in this area, and even states that “[t]he 
                                                          
156 Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 150, at 432. 
157 Id. 
158 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118–19. 
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classification may be inconsequential in some instances, since 
contract remedies, flexibly applied, can afford full compensation 
in many cases.”159 Significant differences between a bad faith 
contract claim and a bad faith tort claim can arise in certain 
cases, but not all of these differences favor tort as the preferred 
consumer-protective source. Perhaps the main differences 
between allowing a bad faith claim in tort versus contract are: 
“(1) [where] the claim is characterized as a tort, generally a shorter 
limitation period applies; (2) classifying it as a contract claim may 
affect whether the claim is assignable to a third party; . . . (3) if 
the claim sounds in tort, a broader measure of damages may be 
available to the insured”;160 and (4) the strict liability standard of 
care in bad faith contract cases is easier for consumers to meet 
than the negligence or intentional standards of bad faith tort 
cases161 — that is, if the cause of action is found under contract, 
the question is often not whether the insurer negligently or 
intentionally caused harm, but only whether the insurer 
breached.162 From a consumer standpoint, two of these factors — 
(1) and (4) — favor contract, and the remaining two favor tort. 
The superiority of a tort claim is unclear where states apply 
contractual remedies flexibly, especially in insurance cases. 
“In addition to insurance custom and practice and 
common law judicial precedent, statutory law usually establishes 
a right of action for any policyholder who is the victim of an 
unfair claim practice.”163 Even statutes that do not provide a 
cause of action can establish a benchmark against which courts 
can measure insurer actions to determine whether common law 
bad faith is established. At the very least, violation of the statute 
is evidence that the insurer acted in bad faith.164 Additionally, 
                                                          
159 Id. (citing JERRY, supra note 54, at § 25G, (3d ed. 2002)). 
160 BJORKMAN, ET AL., supra note 87, at § 29:20. 
161 BAKER, supra note 8, at 111.  
162 See, e.g., Id. (citing Hayseeds, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 352 
S.E.2d 73, 78–79 (W. Va. 1986), for proposition that insureds should be entitled 
to strict liability standard against their insurers.). In Hayseeds,  the court 
stated: “[W]e hold today that when a policyholder substantially prevails in a 
property damage suit against an insurer, the policyholder is entitled to 
damages for net economic loss caused by the delay in settlement, as well as an 
award for aggravation and inconvenience.” Id. at 80. An exception to this 
dichotomy is found in Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993) (applying 
quasi-negligence standard to bad faith stemming from contract).  
163 STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 3, at § 10.03[E]. 
164 KENT & BARKER, supra note 84, at § 10.05 
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states have adopted, usually with minor modifications, a version 
of NAIC’s Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices in the Business of Insurance model act, under 
which the states provide an avenue for insurer punishment and, 
in some jurisdictions, another private cause of action, whether 
explicit or implied in the statute.165  
Indeed, states have generally been expanding the 
availability of bad faith claims both by the common law and by 
statute. Both legislatures and courts have been well aware of this 
issue for some time. Particularly, many of the cases that Professor 
Randall cites come from jurisdictions with either a common law 
or statutory remedy for bad faith. For example, she cites a first-
party case166 based on Maryland law as one of a “significant 
number of recent decisions stat[ing] that contract rather than tort 
provides the theoretical basis for bad faith breach in first-party as 
well as third-party actions.”167 Yet the explicit Maryland rule that 
common law bad faith actions are based in contract dates at least 
to 1961, with roots extending to 1904.168 More importantly, in 
2007, the Maryland legislature passed a law giving insureds the 
ability to sue insurers for first-party bad faith in property and 
casualty disputes.169 This statute is perhaps the starkest example 
of why Professor Randall’s proposal should not be adopted by 
courts. The Maryland courts, by applying consistent contract-
based law for decades, gave the legislature a predictable judicial 
landscape against which elected lawmakers could adopt a rule 
fitting the policy needs of the state, which in this instance was a 
private cause of action for first-party breach of good faith claims. 
Since the passage of the statute, it has been liberally construed to 
                                                          
165 See id. at § 10.04 (citing numerous state approaches and giving nuances 
of each). 
166 Hartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 269 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2001). 
167 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118. 
168 See Mesmer v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Md. 1999) 
(“[I]t is only when a breach of contract is also a violation of a duty imposed by 
law that the injured party has a choice of remedies.”) (quoting Heckrotte v. 
Riddle, 168 A.2d 879, 881–82 (Md. 1961). See also Samuel v. Novak, 58 A. 19, 
20 (Md. 1904). Randall gives no indication that this long-standing doctrine has 
ever been used differently in insurance cases in Maryland. Indeed, even as 
early as 1988, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated, “We are aware 
of no Maryland cases which recognize as a tort action the bad faith failure of 
an insurer to pay a first party claim.” Johnson v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 536 
A.2d 1211, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). Thus, this is not a new concept in 
Maryland. 
169 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1701 (West 2010). 
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favor insureds.170 
Other cases from jurisdictions that are currently moving 
bad faith from tort to contract are similarly unsupportive of 
Randall’s argument that consumers are at a disadvantage in first-
party171 and third-party172 claims. Additionally, there is little 
                                                          
170 See, e.g., Cecilia Schwaber Trust Two v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 
636 F. Supp. 2d 481, 486 (D. Md. 2009) (rejecting, in favor of a broad 
interpretation of the statute, the oft-limiting “fairly debatable standard” used 
by many courts to allow bad faith suits only where payment is not fairly 
debatable). 
171 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118 n.31. For example, 
she offers Coleman Dupont Homsey v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 433, 
437 (D. Del. 2007), but first-party claims of bad faith have been based in 
contract in Delaware for fifteen years. See Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 256 (Del. 1995). Further, Delaware allows recovery 
under the contractual remedy of bad faith for costs and fees, plus expectation 
and consequential damages. See, e.g., Sharon Tennyson & William J. Warfel, 
The Emergence and Potential Consequences of First-Party Insurance Bad-
Faith Liability, 28 J. INS. REG. 3, 7 (2008). Under Virginia law, for which 
Randall cites HHC Assocs. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 256 F. Supp. 2d 505, 508 
(E.D. Va. 2003), bad faith actions have sounded in contract law since at least 
1966. See, generally, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Price, 146 S.E.2d 220, 228 (Va. 
1966). However, Virginia courts allow for expanded, tort-like damages in bad 
faith claims. See Levine v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 462 S.E.2d 81 (Va. 1995). 
Further, a Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209 (West 2010), and its 
citing decisions (including Price) have addressed this issue, providing that 
individuals who win bad faith disputes against insurers are able to recover, in 
addition to the contractual payment, costs and fees rather than tort damages. 
Thus, at least in Virginia, Randall’s fear that courts have been recently 
reverting to contract principles is unfounded; further, the legislature has 
spoken on the issue and is thus aware of judicial interpretations. Randall’s 
New Jersey example, Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993), clearly 
cuts against her argument because there the court states that, “Compensation 
should not be dependent on what label we place on an action but rather on the 
nature of the injury inflicted on the plaintiff and the remedies requested. An 
insurance company’s breach of the fiduciary obligation imposed by virtue of 
its policy, by its wrongful failure to settle, ‘sounds in both tort and contract.’” 
Pickett, 621 A.2d at 452 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. 
of Am., 323 A.2d 495 (N.J. 1974). The court went on to expand the remedies 
available under contract, while imposing a negligence-like standard of care. 
With Rova Farms, New Jersey became one of the first states to address the 
first-party cause of action sounding in tort by mixing it with contract law 
shortly after California led the way in 1973. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 
P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). For a discussion, see Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. 
Mgmt., Ltd., No. 97-CV-3496 DRD, 2009 WL 5064757 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2009). 
She also cites Bhattacharyya v. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 799 N.Y.S.2d 158 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004), in which the court simply stated that the plaintiffs had 
not pleaded facts sufficient to rise to the level of a tort of bad faith. 
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reason to worry about consumers who, in states allowing only a 
cause of action under contract, might be improperly precluded 
                                                          
Bhattacharyya, 799 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The New York first-party rule is, like the 
New Jersey Rule, that although the cause of action sounds in contract, broad 
tort-like remedies are available under it. Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. 
Co., 886 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 2008); Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. 
Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y. 2008); See generally Charles Platto et al., 
New York’s New “Good Faith” Standard—What Does It Mean for “Bad 
Faith”?, 30 NO. 6 INS. LITIG. REP. 165 (2008). Next, Randall cites Zenor v. 
Standard Ins. Co., No. Civ. 01-1226-FR, 2002 WL 31466503, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 
3, 2002). Oregon indeed is a state whose courts have stayed away from a first-
party cause of action in tort altogether, allowing only contract-style recovery 
for these plaintiffs. Employers’ Fire Ins. Co. v. Love It Ice Cream Co., 670 
P.2d 160, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Strader v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 39 P.3d 
903, 905-06 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). Interestingly, however, the legislature in 
Oregon—which has already provided for unfair claim settlement complaints 
and attorneys’ fees for winning plaintiffs—has begun to consider proposals for 
a bad faith statute. See, e.g., H.B. 2791, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) 
(would allow for a private action in contract or tort for both first- and third-
party claims).  
172 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 119 n.32. For example, 
she gives New York, citing New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters 
Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 2003), which applied New York law. 
In New York, however, the contract roots of third-party bad faith, even in the 
insurance context, have been present since at least 1976. Roldan v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 544 N.Y.S.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (citing Town of Poland v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 385 N.Y.S.2d 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that a 
bad faith claim did not sound in negligence but in breach of contract, and that 
the statute of limitations was therefore six years)). Randall also uses Missouri 
as an example, citing Ross v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 06-0811-CV-W-
FJG, 2007 WL 1774443 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2007) as a case that has recently 
stated that bad faith action for refusal to defend is contract-based, while a bad 
faith action for refusal to settle sounds in tort. Yet, as with other states, this 
principle has been around in Missouri for decades. Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. 
Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo. 1950) (holding that bad faith actions for refusal 
to settle are based in tort, even though they arise out of contracts); See also 
Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (detailing 
the difference between bad faith actions for refusal to settle, which are based 
in tort, and bad faith actions for duty to defend, which are based in contract; 
the court also notes, as Professor Jerry did later (see JERRY, supra note 54), that 
even if the plaintiff recovers only under the duty to defend, he still must 
recover such an amount, including attorney’s fees, as to put him in the position 
he would have been in had the defendant not breached the contract). Further, 
both New York and Missouri have statutes under which insureds can recover, 
at least, interest and attorney’s fees when suing their insurer. N.Y. INS. LAW § 
5106 (McKinney 2010); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 375.296, 375.420 (West 2010) 
(allowing for penalty). She cites cases from various other jurisdictions, most of 
which have similar statutes.  
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from having their legitimate claims heard. After all, if an insurer 
has no relationship with the consumer, then there is no duty of 
good faith connecting the insurer to the consumer. Alternatively, 
if there is a relationship and the insurer unreasonably denies 
coverage, then that act alone is likely to be seen as a breach of the 
duty of good faith.173 Randall herself cites, with no apparent 
disfavor, Professor Jerry’s assertion that the difference in a bad 
faith claim arising from contract as opposed to one in tort is of 
little consequence because contract remedies are often applied 
flexibly enough to give full compensation.174 Thus, Randall’s call 
to arms — to combat “recent decisions” that have supposedly 
turned against the widespread use of bad faith as a tort arising 
out of a breach of insurance policy — is largely unnecessary.  
In fact, it appears that a shift has occurred in the opposite 
direction, even regarding the relatively new doctrine of first-party 
bad faith: “Recent decisions . . . have tipped the scales decisively 
in favor of the first-party tort and have clearly established it as 
the majority rule.”175 As of this writing, twenty-eight states 
recognize the bad faith cause of action in tort and five more allow 
for tort-like damages; thirteen have rejected the bad faith tort; 
one requires a malicious mind on the part of the insurer before 
finding bad faith in tort; and Massachusetts has yet to decide (it 
has little reason to do so, since its statutory remedies are so 
strong).176 The trend, then, is for more, not less, protection of 
consumers by courts and legislatures in the realm of bad faith. 
4. Conclusion 
The strong contra proferentem doctrine is still alive and 
well in many of the jurisdictions that Randall implies to have 
recently deserted it, and, given the lack of extrinsic evidence for 
passive insureds, most consumers are protected just as well by the 
doctrine in jurisdictions applying the normal-version as those in 
                                                          
173 See, e.g., Hardy v. Hartford Ins. Co., 236 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(illustrating how surprising it would be for a court to find bad faith where the 
insurer was reasonable in its denial of coverage: “[T]he district court did not 
err in failing to conclude that Hartford lacked good faith even as a matter of 
law, because Hartford had no duty to provide a defense or coverage to 
Hardy.”). 
174 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 118 n.30 (citing JERRY, 
supra note 54, at § 25G). 
175 ASHLEY, supra note 90, at § 2:15. 
176 Id. 
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strong-version jurisdictions. Additionally, the pure reasonable 
expectations doctrine is a consumer-harming principle that never 
took hold in most courts, and its demise is a happy event. As for 
bad faith protection, it is actually on the rise. These three 
doctrines in their varying forms, when coupled with such 
ubiquitous measures as the unconscionability doctrine177 and 
statutory remedies, prove that consumer protection is at the 
forefront of insurance law.  
Legislatures have, in almost every instance, had many 
years to contemplate consumer-protective rules where they see 
failures in the common law. Indeed, the area of consumer 
protection has been, and continues to be, heavily addressed by 
state legislatures in favor of insureds. Randall, in support of her 
argument that courts have recently begun ignoring consumers in 
favor of rigid, insurer-favoring contract doctrines, cites case law 
from various jurisdictions. She fails to show, however, any reason 
why consistent differences between different states, with some 
states using more liberal protections than others, should be 
viewed generally as a judicial movement away from consumer 
protection warranting such a drastic proposal. That is, courts in 
one state, using more or less consumer-protective doctrines, do 
not directly affect courts in other states.  
Further, Randall has not tied the states together or shown 
that the courts in any one state have stopped caring about 
consumers. The closest she comes to noting a trend is in her 
discussion of the reasonable expectations doctrine. But that 
doctrine is harmful, encouraging costly litigation and creating 
uncertainty for consumers and insurers alike; judges have acted 
prudently and in consumers’ interest by rejecting this doctrine. 
Finally, Randall fails to show that courts in any one state have, 
through time, repudiated the plight of consumers in favor of 
traditional contract law or that legislatures are providing 
inadequate consumer protections. In short, her evidence, which is 
not logically tied to interstate or intrastate movement away from 
consumer protection, fails to support her thesis. 
Consequently, the problems Randall finds with judicial 
interpretation are in fact not problems at all for consumers. 
Giving her the benefit of any doubt, however, this article will 
now address what she offers as her second reason for reform: that 
                                                          
177 See supra note 70 for a very brief overview of the unconscionability 
doctrine. 
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the supposed current movement away from consumer-protective 
doctrines is made within the special context of contracts subject 
not to private agreement but, rather, to legislative intent. Her 
proposal – namely that judicial interpretation and construction 
be reformed in light of regulatory goals — is a dangerous plan 
that would harm consumers by creating uncertainty, instability, 
and, consequently, higher rates or reduced coverage.  
B. Insurance Policies Are Special, but They Are Still Contracts 
In explaining and bolstering her proposal to protect 
consumers from what she sees as judicial movement away from 
consumer-protective doctrines, Professor Randall argues that 
insurance policies are not really contracts between private parties 
and therefore should not be evaluated by courts as such. She 
states that consumers have no freedom of contract because 
consumer insurance is doled out in the form of adhesive, 
standardized instruments. Consumers are faced with the choice to 
either purchase insurance coverage for a risk or not—there is no 
negotiation of terms. Insurers, likewise, have no freedom of 
contract because of statutorily-mandated inclusions and required 
departmental approval of policy language.178 This lack of freedom 
to contract, she argues, suggests that insurance policies are not 
really contracts to be evaluated according to the intent of parties 
buying and selling coverage as reflected in contractual language. 
Indeed, she says, “‘[N]o intent of the parties’ undergirds the 
substantive terms and provisions of the policy,”179 indicating 
instead that the intent of the legislature undergirds those terms. 
In this view, the legislature and insurance department — not the 
parties — have effectively created the agreement, and when the 
language of that agreement reaches a court for interpretation, the 
court should seek the intent of the legislature and insurance 
department — not that of the parties. Because both consumers 
and insurers are constrained in their ability to create or modify 
terms, Randall says, “[T]he routine judicial invocation of the 
principle of freedom of contract in insurance cases is a 
fundamental error.”180  
Her thesis is imperfect because: (1) insureds, as a group, 
benefit from the lower transaction costs of adhesive, standardized 
                                                          
178 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126–35. 
179 Id. at 108. 
180 Id. at 124. 
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contracts and are not precluded from reading their policies or 
clarifying meaning with their insurance agents; (2) insurers also 
benefit from the lower transaction costs that come with adhesive, 
standardized contracts and have the ability to create and modify 
the language of their policies—legislatures do not mandate nearly 
enough language to, for example, put the ISO out of business; and 
(3) legislatures mandate language because they expect insurers to 
include it in standardized, adhesive contracts so that consumers 
will be predictably and uniformly protected by it. If what 
Professor Randall says is true, that legislative and not private 
intent is reflected in insurance relationships, then legislatures 
have the ability to cleanly modify the interpretive system if they 
choose. Legislative acquiescence in and encouragement of judicial 
interpretation under contract law speaks volumes about how 
legislatures want to protect the public. When legislatures want 
coverage or protection for consumers, they mandate it; courts 
then comply with the mandate. This simple system is not broken. 
Professor Randall’s proposal that judges predict the thoughts of 
legislatures in interpreting insurance policies places the third 
governmental branch ahead of the first. 
“On any view, parties need not bargain when the cost of 
doing so outweighs the gains from customizing the transaction.”181 
By purchasing adhesive contracts that are subject to efficiency-
enhancing and consumer-protecting regulation,182 insureds benefit 
from lower premiums and lower opportunity cost. As Randall 
                                                          
181 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1208 (1983).  
182 There is a concern that adhesive contracts are agreed to by boundedly 
rational consumers, who take only some contractual terms (especially price) 
into account when deciding to purchase insurance. Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1203, 1203 (2003). This can lead to insurers writing terms favorable to 
themselves in areas that consumers ignore, thereby keeping more of the 
cooperative surplus of the deal for themselves. Id. One solution to this problem 
is to have legislatures correct this market failure by mandating terms and pre-
approving language. Id. This is exactly what legislatures do. Where 
legislatures fail to protect consumers, courts pick up the slack by using 
doctrines such as unconscionability, contra proferentem, and bad faith against 
insurers. Professor Korobkin’s suggestion that courts go farther, evaluating 
adhesive contracts based on consumers’ bounded rationality (as predicted by 
social science) and economic forces, would be impossible for generalist judges 
to apply. Such specialized and broad-reaching decisions should be made by 
legislatures. 
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recognizes,183 insurers need standardized data to make accurate 
actuarial predictions, to charge relatively low premiums, and to 
offer insurance as widely as possible. Standardized data requires 
near-standardization of forms, and the Insurance Services Office 
has grown to both gather data and offer such standardization.  
While it is true that many consumers do not read their 
insurance policies, insurers do not prevent them from doing so. At 
the very least, concerned consumers could read and understand 
the plain language of the policy and address questions and 
clarifications with their insurance agents, thereby coming to 
know what is and is not covered. Indeed, consumers in 
jurisdictions like New Mexico and Arkansas could, if they 
wished, even create helpful extrinsic evidence through this 
clarification process.184 
Randall claims that insurance policies should not be 
treated as contracts because insurers cannot freely include all of 
the terms they want, and must include some terms that they 
perhaps do not want. Her claim in this area is that regulators 
impose rules on insurers to protect consumers, yet she admits 
that, “These limitations obviously do not preclude invocation of 
the principle of freedom of contract in policy interpretation. 
However, the scope and extent of regulatory control over the 
content of insurance policies strongly suggests that freedom of 
contract is not an appropriate analytical starting point.”185 Thus, 
her argument seems to be that insurers have some freedom of 
contract, but not enough to actually use contract as an 
interpretive judicial paradigm. In her words:  
 
The extensive regulation of insurance policy 
language, ranging from legislatively-mandated 
provisions to required administrative approval of 
policies, renders the model of private contract and 
the principle of freedom of contract irrelevant in 
interpretation of insurance policies. Courts should 
approach the construction of insurance policies 
mindful that they are not individually negotiated 
bargains but highly regulated documents; the 
judicial goal should be ascertaining and 
effectuating regulatory goals, rather than the 
                                                          
183 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 124. 
184 See supra Part IV(A)(1). 
185 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126 (emphasis added). 
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illusory intent of the parties.186  
 
Additionally, contrasting her proposal with the present system, 
she argues:  
 
[W]here policies are viewed not as a bargain 
between parties, but as standard documents 
governed by statute and requiring regulatory 
approval, the analysis changes. Considerations 
external to the policy become relevant, including 
the statutory framework and the intent of the 
legislature; the power of the regulator and the 
nature and aims of the approval process, as well as 
the role of the judiciary in reviewing administrative 
actions; and broad public policy concerns, as 
defined by statute, regulation, and decisional law.187  
 
That is, she not only advocates applying statutes, but applying 
vague purposes that may be discovered by evaluating the 
statutory framework, in addition to broad public policy concerns 
that might be gleaned from laws, departmental regulations, and 
even common law. Thus, Randall incorrectly bases her proposal 
on the notion that the language of insurance policies has little, if 
anything, to do with private parties — even the intent of the 
insurance company is ignored and is, from its rates to its terms, 
controlled and dictated by state regulators. A few areas do have 
commonly mandated forms, such as state fire and workers’ 
compensation policies.188 Generally, however, the state simply 
mandates specific coverage provisions or precludes some 
exclusions, and the policy language used to reach those goals is a 
decision resting with the company.189 If states generally wrote 
policies, those policies would be public law that courts, subject to 
constitutional limitations, would have to follow. Additionally, if 
insurance policies were really created by legislatures, then any 
claim that they do not protect consumers would be a direct 
                                                          
186 Id. at 146–47. 
187 Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
188 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3404 (McKinney 2010) (providing New 
York’s standard fire insurance form); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2052.002 
(Vernon 2010). 
189 See Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 129–34, for a general 
discussion. 
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attack, not on courts, but on those elected by the public to create 
protective laws.  
However, as Randall admits,190 insurance policies are not 
public laws passed by legislatures. They are regulated, to be sure, 
but setting regulatory boundaries does not make policies more or 
less than contracts; today, nearly all contracts — not just 
insurance contracts — are standardized, adhesive forms into 
which legislatures willingly insert themselves, either by way of 
the UCC or other legislation.191 Most contracts that consumers 
enter into are very much like insurance policies from a freedom of 
contract perspective, and ending the application of contract law 
to insurance contracts would likely lead to unprofitable 
disruptions in other areas of contract law. More importantly, 
insurance companies need uniformity and predictability when 
providing insurance to large numbers of people, and they 
therefore welcome standardized language — even language 
mandated by a legislature — as long as it is predictable.192 As 
Stempel puts it:  
 
Of course, the super-adhesive nature of insurance 
policies does not make them “bad” or legally 
suspect. Standardized adhesion contracts are 
probably the majority of contracts in use today and 
are widely enforced. . . . [T]hey not only lower 
transaction costs but facilitate risk spreading 
through developing a risk pool of policyholders all 
subject to the same contract language.193  
                                                          
190 Id. at 126 (no longer claiming that insurance policies are all but 
statutes, she merely says that freedom of contract is “significantly limited for 
companies as well [as] for policyholders”). 
191 See Slawson, supra note 36, at 529 (“Standard form contracts probably 
account for more than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made. Most 
persons have difficulty remembering the last time they contracted other than 
by standard form; except for casual oral agreements, they probably never 
have. But if they are active, they contract by standard form several times a 
day. Parking lot and theater tickets, package receipts, department store charge 
slips, and gas station credit card purchase slips are all standard form 
contracts.”). 
192 See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 66, at 1105-06 (explaining that 
insurance companies need consistency and predictability; therefore, even 
language that courts interpret against them will continue to be used as long as 
the court rulings are predictable, this argument is easily extended to 
statutorily-mandated language). 
193 Stempel, supra note 59, at 830. 
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Additionally, most terms in a given insurance policy are 
not mandated by law. The insurer chooses or modifies ISO 
language, or creates its own language within statutory parameters 
and requirements. In almost every instance, it is the insurer who 
submits its forms to the regulators for approval — not the 
regulators who submit forms to the insurer to employ.  
Randall’s own discussion, in which she looks to regulatory 
goals as the guiding light for judges, demonstrates that 
legislatures, not courts, have the duty to protect consumers 
through new laws. Doctrines such as unconscionability, contra 
proferentem, fraud, and bad faith allow courts to protect 
consumers while preserving legislative policymaking power. As 
she recognizes, rate regulation; pre-approval of policy forms’ 
content, readability, and format; mandated inclusion of specific 
types of coverage; limits on an insurer’s ability to cancel policies; 
and other safeguards have largely been the province of 
legislatures194 — legislatures that create these laws while choosing 
not to fundamentally modify consistent interpretive judicial 
frameworks. Legislatures do protect consumers by mandating 
some policy terms and prohibiting some insurer actions. 
However, legislatures have left most insurance decisions to the 
private contracts, through which private parties buy and sell 
insurance subject to approved language. Nothing about this 
scheme chosen by legislatures suggests that courts could capably 
take the place of lawmakers by judging insurance disputes on the 
basis of unstated regulatory goals, and state regulators suggest 
their comfort with judicial use of contract law by not regulating 
more.  
Everything about the current system, with state 
policymakers regulating insurance and state courts interpreting 
insurance policies as regulated contracts, points to legislative 
contentment with the mechanisms by which consumers are 
protected. Indeed, legislatures have, thus far, refused to turn 
insurance into something akin to a public utility, even though 
they presumably could if they wished. Legislatures, in the very 
act of mandating and approving policy language, indicate that 
they want insurance policies to be treated as contracts. Truly, by 
making laws within the framework rather than modifying that 
framework, legislatures manifest their desire to treat insurance 
                                                          
194 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 126–35. 
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policies as contracts.  
Courts are required to apply insurance laws,195 and they 
have to give deference to authoritative administrative 
pronouncements,196 such as those from insurance commissioners. 
Randall does not suggest that courts are ignoring their 
legislatures or insurance departments when a law or regulation 
applies. Instead, she wants the courts to take over the legislative 
role where judges consider that legislatures have not done enough 
in reaching their own goals. Additionally, Randall does not 
recognize that insurers themselves acquiesce to mandated policy 
language because, mandated or not, such language is 
predictable.197 Predictability is the watchword of all actuarial 
work, and without it, insurance companies would have to narrow 
the scope of their coverage or increase rates. Even if a mandated 
term appears to impede upon insurance companies’ freedom of 
contract, the companies prefer fixed, predictable language over 
the alternative. Indeed, much more important than the separation 
of powers problem is the problem of implementation and what 
effect judges’ use of regulatory goals to interpret insurance 
policies would have on insurers and insureds alike.  
C. The Practical Effects of Professor Randall’s Proposal 
Randall appears to advocate, as does most everyone, that 
courts continue to apply the law where the legislature clearly 
speaks. She states, however, that when the legislature has not 
mandated policy language by law:  
 
[C]ourts should rely on interpretive constructs that 
                                                          
195 For example, where an insurance policy violates a statute, the policy or 
the offensive term must be struck down — even though the insurance 
department gave implicit approval of the policy by not rejecting it. See, e.g., 
Gonzalez v. Assocs. Life Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
196 Although implicit policy approval does not normally warrant much 
deference because the department’s inaction causes such approval, where the 
department acts authoritatively, it is normally given deference. See, e.g., 
Craley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 530, 537 (Pa. 2006). 
197 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water and Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702 (1978) (recognizing the need for and legitimacy of predictability in 
the actuarial process even while striking down a retirement plan provision 
requiring women to pay longer than men given their longer average lifespan. 
However, the ban did not apply retroactively to plans already in place because 
of the presumed good faith with which pension fund administrators used 
actual science in reaching their conclusions). 
Wilkerson Article.docx (Do Not Delete)  3/23/2011  3:39:00 PM 
2011] Adjudicating Insurance Policy Disputes 349 
emphasis [sic] regulatory goals and strategies: 
solvency of insurance companies, fairness to 
consumers, and availability of insurance198. . . . 
Courts often approach the task of interpretation of 
insurance provisions without acknowledgment of 
the legislative and administrative role in the 
drafting and approval of insurance policies. . . . 
Acknowledgment of legislative and administrative 
involvement through mandated provisions and 
policy approvals shifts the interpretative focus 
from effectuating the parties’ intent to effectuating 
regulatory goals.199  
 
This appears to be a call for courts to ask, “What would the 
legislature do?” In easy cases — those that have a statute directly 
on point, for example — there would be no need to surmise the 
legislature’s intentions regarding solvency, fairness, or 
availability because the statutory directive would be clear. 
However, courts would have to guess what the legislature would 
want in the innumerable situations that have heretofore been 
governed by the common law or, subject to mandated language, 
are still subject to more than one interpretation.200 Under this 
scheme, a new, unpredictable common law of insurance contracts 
would arise — one that is based not on relatively consistent 
judicial decisions, but rather on what particular judges think 
particular legislatures would want if called upon to resolve 
particular disputes between litigants.  
Among the practical problems with this proposal are: a 
lack of political accountability for the new judicial policymakers; 
economic inefficiency both within and between states; and a 
litigation explosion, with legislative intent becoming relevant to 
the discovery process, and insurance policy language being 
uncertain until ruled on by a court in light of the legislative goals 
presented. 
First, the role of judges is not to weigh policy goals; their 
purpose is to adjudicate disputes under law; even though many 
                                                          
198 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 108. 
199 Id. at 135. 
200 The fact that there are disputes over coverage in areas with mandated 
forms, such fire insurance and workers’ compensation, shows that even 
legislatively-creative language might be up for interpretation on some 
occasions.  
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judges201 acquire their positions by election and are subject to 
political implications of their decisions.202 But no judge, at the 
trial level or otherwise, can weigh and balance the public interest 
of an entire state. Judges, elected or appointed, simply cannot do 
the legislature’s job. 
Second, Professor Randall’s proposal would not only harm 
intrastate consistency by creating inconsistency from term to term 
and from election to election, but also the generally consistent 
application of terms between states. Policy language — generated 
by the ISO or otherwise — frequently becomes popular across 
many states, and states interpreting contract terms for the first 
time are often aided by decisions of other states’ courts that have 
interpreted the term. Courts may even find a term unambiguous 
as a matter of law if it has been interpreted consistently by other 
states’ courts.203 Under Randall’s proposal, when interpreting and 
construing un-mandated insurance policy language, courts in 
each state would have to look first, and perhaps exclusively, to 
the goals of their own legislature. They could not seek help from 
other states’ courts unless they were convinced that the 
regulatory goals in each state, under the current legislatures of 
each state, were substantively identical. Thus, Randall’s proposal 
would contribute to harmful interstate inconsistency of term 
interpretation, leading almost certainly to higher administrative 
costs for insurers, higher premiums for insureds, more federal 
                                                          
201 Currently, thirty-nine states elect at least some of their judges. 
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790–91 (2002) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 U.S. 2252, 2274 
(2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? 
Why Popular Elections are Preferable to Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 1 (2004) (describing and critiquing the general systems of judicial 
elections and appointments). 
202 In these states, “[E]lected judges — regardless of whether they have 
announced any views beforehand — always face the pressure of an electorate 
who might disagree with their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.” 
White, 536 U.S. at 782. There is little doubt that elected judges would, if asked 
to explicitly consider policy arguments, favor those arguments that they think 
will get them re-elected in their district. Thus, Randall’s proposal would be 
even more problematic in these states, where adjudications of insurance policy 
disputes would be made by a single person who is politically accountable to a 
limited geographic constituency. 
203 See Fisher v. Tyler, 394 A.2d 1199, 1202–03 (Md. 1978); Hanneman v. 
Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 445, 451 (N.D. 1998) (finding the 
interpretations of other states’ courts persuasive in determining the meaning of 
the term “borrow”). 
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discomfort with state regulation of insurance, and, ultimately, to 
federal regulation. 
Playing down the significance of her proposal in 
encouraging inconsistency, however, Professor Randall states 
that the outcome of many disputes will be the same regardless of 
whether courts evaluate insurance policy language from a 
contractual or a regulatory perspective.204 This, she says, is 
because “the legislative and administrative role in mandating or 
approving policy language suggests that the language of policies 
should be enforced.”205 Thus, she reasons that legislatures and 
insurance departments are so heavily involved in regulating 
insurance policies that their intent is reflected in policy language, 
and, therefore, there is apparently little need for a shift in judicial 
interpretation. This article has already shown, not least by the 
very existence of the ISO, that this notion is unfounded. 
However, admitting that legislatures and insurance departments 
have near plenary power over insurance policies, even if they 
choose not use it, which is what Professor Randall seems to 
ignore, is fatal to her proposal because within that admission is a 
recognition that the legislature, well aware of what courts are up 
to, can increase or decrease their hold over insurance at any time. 
In other words, Randall recognizes that legislatures and 
insurance departments already hold the power to regulate, 
mandate, and approve insurance policies. With so much power to 
dictate what courts see and how they construe language, it is 
natural to assume that regulators have not been more explicit 
because they (and, by extension, their constituents) are content 
with courts interpreting insurance policies as regulated contracts 
between private parties, rather than legislation.  
Third, underlying Randall’s proposal is a concern for 
consumers, yet consumers would almost certainly be harmed by 
her plan. She laments that “[i]n recent years, courts have been 
inclined to enforce insurance policies as written, with the goal of 
effectuating the intentions of the parties and the result that the 
insurance company typically prevails.”206 Thus, she argues, if 
courts interpret insurance agreements with the sole purpose of 
effectuating the intent of legislatures and insurance departments, 
                                                          
204 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 108. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 107. This statement is logically inconsistent with her claim just 
one page later that under both contract interpretation and under her proposal, 
courts will in most instances uphold the policy language.  
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“courts can protect consumers’ substantive rights regarding 
insurance coverage, rather than an illusory freedom of 
contract.”207 This underlying goal to help consumers is one of the 
considerations that state legislatures, which actually hold the 
power to make improvements to the system, take into account 
when creating laws that regulate insurance.208 That it is not the 
only consideration belies the fact that Professor Randall 
overlooks, in this article at least, the purposes of regulation 
beyond consumer protection. Randall’s proposal is basically to 
turn courts into policymaking consumer advocates that attempt 
to act for the legislature when the legislature has not acted. 
Legislatures struggle to do what is best for the public in light of 
all of the goals of insurance regulation, including consumer 
protection, insurer solvency and profit margins, consumer access 
to insurance protection, and pricing standards.209 Advising courts 
to consider only one of those goals in making their decisions is 
incredibly narrow and would be detrimental to the balance that 
legislatures attempt to strike between all of the legitimate, 
sometimes competing goals of regulation.  
However, courts, if they begin following Randall’s 
proposal at all, might not take her underlying purpose of 
consumer protection as their main goal; they might, in fact, try to 
balance all of the policy considerations surrounding insurance 
regulation. The fact that legislatures acquire mountains of 
information from economic, fiscal, and political analysts when 
deciding how to balance regulatory goals begs the question of 
how courts might be expected to carry out this process. Courts 
must judge cases on the evidence and arguments before them—
that is, the facts and the legal and policy arguments that the 
parties present in relation to those facts. Parties find facts to 
insert into the record mainly through the discovery process.  
Under Randall’s proposal, legislative facts and regulators’ 
legal and policy arguments would become the focus of litigation. 
Assuming the insurance department or some other regulatory 
                                                          
207 Id. at 109. 
208 Of course, some laws — such as those ensuring solvency of all insurers, 
thereby preventing guaranty fund action — do benefit responsible insurers, 
but it must be recognized that most insurance regulations have a pro-consumer 
intent. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 7009 (McKinney 2010) (allowing insurance 
superintendent to prohibit or limit a captive insurer’s investments so as to 
promote solvency). 
209 Baker, supra note 8, at 637–56. 
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representative did not intervene to represent public policy, an 
attacking insured would have to prove that consumer protection 
is the policy goal that needs following. Alternatively, insurers 
would likely argue for insurer solvency or some other favorable 
regulatory purpose. Whatever their arguments, the parties would 
have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation—in 
striking contrast to legislative ideals, in which the deliberative 
process promotes the public, as opposed to the litigant’s, interest. 
Private interest would push litigants to use the discovery process 
to emphasize their strengths and downplay their opponent’s. 
They would likely issue subpoenas to the insurance department 
and might even seek information from the state legislature in 
seeking to prove that their interpretation of legislative goals is 
most valid. Such a system, in which legislative facts, 
pronouncements, and regulatory intentions would become 
relevant to particular court cases, would explode the discovery 
process, making it veritably boundless. In such a system, 
consumer plaintiffs would almost certainly be overcome by the 
vast resources of insurance companies that could be used to seek 
out, sift through, and present policy arguments that support their 
position. Judges would have the unenviable task of sitting in the 
legislature’s stead, attempting to protect the plaintiff while 
weighing other policymaking goals presented by the parties and 
deciding what the current legislature would do with the narrow 
question presented by the litigants.  
If Randall’s proposal is implemented and judges follow 
her suggestions by ignoring regulatory balancing and focusing 
mainly on consumer protection, the regulatory framework will 
crumble, leading toward insolvency, higher rates, and restricted 
coverage. If, on the other hand, judges sit as proxy for the 
legislature but give weight to insurers’ evidence of the balance 
that should be struck, then insureds will almost certainly be 
unable to maintain the pace and breadth of discovery and trial 
preparation that the resourceful companies will display. Either 
way, transaction and litigation costs will increase, uncertainty of 
coverage will be rife, and consumers will lose. 
As a final note, Professor Randall does not address the fact 
that consumers are more protected than ever, both by judicial 
doctrines, including, perhaps most importantly, the 
unconscionability doctrine, and legislative fiat. Further, she does 
not recognize that legislatures, not courts, are those with the 
power to regulate the business of insurance under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. More importantly, she does not address the burden 
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of unpredictability and, ultimately, costs to both insurers and 
consumers that would result if her proposal were implemented. 
1. Professor Randall’s Proposal Is Much Like the Failed 
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine 
As this article has shown,210 Professor Keeton’s reasonable 
expectations doctrine failed because it was unpredictable and 
would have led to increased litigation, higher premiums, and less 
coverage. Indeed, under that doctrine, an insured could not know 
what his policy meant until a judge made a ruling on its 
meaning—perhaps not in accord with the insured’s wishes. The 
doctrine would have allowed clear, unambiguous policy language 
to be trumped by the policyholder’s reasonable expectations, and 
“[t]he shape of the analysis in a particular case will depend on the 
structure and provisions of individual state insurance codes, 
administrative procedure acts, and regulations, as well as the 
particulars of the department’s review and approval process.”211 
Such destabilization and unpredictability is rightfully eschewed 
by courts. As stated by one:  
 
There is no logic nor reason to create an obligation 
contrary to and beyond the clear, plain language of 
a policy and Professor Keeton provides none. To 
create such would oblige a party at the whim of one 
whose personal interests are served by the 
conversion of an expectancy to a right. It would 
permit the rewriting of a contract by a court, 
without limitation except by what is reasonable for 
an insured to expect.212 
 
Professor Randall’s proposal would also have courts 
ignore clear policy language, and would fail for the same reason 
that the pure reasonable expectations doctrine failed: 
unpredictability. If no statute spoke directly to a litigated issue or 
if the issue was unclear even in the face of a legislative mandate, 
that issue would go to the court, and the court would have to 
consider legislative goals in deciding the question. However, 
                                                          
210 See supra Part IV(A)(2). 
211 Randall, Freedom of Contract, supra note 2, at 136. 
212 Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Marnel, 587 F. Supp. 622, 624 (D. Conn. 
1983). 
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where there is no statute on point, the court would either have to 
ask what past legislatures would have done—analogizing to 
statutes perhaps in other areas of the insurance code—or what 
the current legislature would do with the question. Whether the 
legislature actually wanted to decide that question would be 
irrelevant; whether the legislature wanted the courts to continue 
applying specialized contract law to insurance policies would also 
be beside the point. The court would have to look at the parties 
(which would certainly be few) and the issue in the case (which 
would necessarily be narrow), rely on counsels’ arguments (which 
would vary in quality and depth with the wealth of the litigants), 
and attempt to adjudicate the dispute by balancing regulatory 
goals (which would always be broad, deep, varied, and distorted 
by the lens of litigation). Nobody would know, either from court 
to court at any given time or legislature to legislature through 
time, what un-mandated policy language meant. Insurers, also 
uncertain, would not be able to predict risk and return; they 
would have to protect themselves by charging higher rates, 
narrowing the scope of coverage, or leaving the state. Consumers 
would pay higher prices for insurance, would more often litigate, 
and would be uncertain of the scope of their insurance 
coverage—uncertain, that is, until the legislature somehow 
mandated clearer language, wrote forms itself, or possibly 
authorized the insurance department to write unambiguous forms 
based on regulatory goals that only the legislature can know and 
balance. Since Randall proposes that courts look to legislative 
goals, and since legislative goals are uncertain from day to day 
and from election to election, the uncertainty of judicial decision 
making under the proposal could only be solved by the legislature 
actually writing or mandating language by law. In other words, 
Randall’s proposal, if adopted, would circle back to the true, 
authoritative regulators of insurance: legislatures. 
But the proposal should not reach that point. It should be 
immediately dismissed, and courts should be left to continue their 
relative and, hopefully, predictable approaches to interpreting 
contracts. Legislatures, too, should be left to balance consumer 
protection with the other goals of insurance regulation against a 
predictable judicial backdrop. 
V. Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that insurance is a heavily 
regulated industry, and that regulation has always been at the 
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level of state legislatures. Legislatures, with the help of insurance 
departments they create, have the duty and ability to issue laws 
and regulations and to approve forms and mandate coverage. 
Legislatures can, and sometimes do, even regulate the 
interpretation and construction of contract language and 
consumer representations. This scheme, which keeps rates 
relatively low, coverage broad, and insurers solvent, should not 
be shaken by Professor Randall’s proposal.  
Although her ire is directed at courts for not protecting 
consumers, the true problem, if any, is that legislatures, conscious 
of the largely constant judicial approach within each state, are 
not doing enough to protect consumers. Randall does not accuse 
the courts of disregarding legislative mandates or administrative 
suggestions. Instead, she accuses the courts of applying contract 
law to contracts. The courts exist to resolve cases and 
controversies by applying law to facts—not to create law in the 
legislature’s stead. As recognized in Couch,213 where the 
legislature has mandated language or interpretive rules, courts 
should apply that law; if their concern is for consumers, courts 
can best serve by consistently applying the insurance-specific 
contractual principles already in place and allowing legislatures 
to weigh policy concerns. 
Legislatures have the power to protect consumers by 
creating laws in light of the large amounts of information needed 
to weigh competing policy purposes. To her credit, Randall asks 
that courts apply legislative mandates where available—but this 
is something that courts have always done. The problem with her 
proposal arises in the areas of insurance that legislatures have left 
to private parties’ contractual agreements. There, Randall asks 
that courts apply “regulatory goals”—not laws or longstanding 
principles of interpretation—to resolve disputes. This scheme 
would lead to uncertainty for consumers and insurance 
companies, infringement upon legislatures’ mandate to create 
laws, increasing litigation, and a widening discovery process, all 
                                                          
213 “The rules of statutory interpretation, rather than the contra 
proferentem rule, apply when the terms of an insurance contract are dictated 
by statute; in such circumstances, the real question is or ought to be the intent 
of the legislature, not the intent of the parties to a contract in which neither has 
any real say as to the terms of the agreement.” COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra 
note 7, § 22:22 (citing Matarese v. N.H. Mun. Ass’n Prop. Liab. Ins. Trust, 
Inc., 791 A.2d 175 (N.H. 2002); Chenard v. Commerce Ins. Co., 799 N.E.2d 
108 (Mass. 2003)). 
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while raising transaction costs and insurance premiums.  
Thus, where the legislature has passed a law, the court 
should follow it. Likewise, where the insurance department has 
issued a rule, the court should give it deference. Otherwise, 
judges should be left to apply predictable contract doctrines, 
extra-protective of consumers or otherwise, against which 
informed and deliberative legislatures can further protect 
consumers if such protection is in the interest of the state. To 
borrow Judge Dorsey’s language: “There is no logic nor reason to 
create an obligation contrary to and beyond the clear, plain 
language of a policy and Professor [Randall] provides none. To 
create such would . . . permit the rewriting of a contract by a 
court, without limitation except by what [judges think 
legislatures would do with the question].”214 
 
                                                          
214 Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. at 624. 
